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Among intellectual property ("IP") doctrines, only utility patents
should protect function. Utility patents offer strong rights that place
constraints on competition, but they only arise when inventors can
demonstrate substantial novelty after a costly examination.
Copyrights, trademarks, and design patents are much easier to obtain
than utility patents, and they often last much longer. Accordingly, to
prevent claimants from obtaining "backdoor patents," the other IP
doctrines must screen out functionality. As yet, however, courts and
scholars have paid little systematic attention to the ways in which
these functionality screens operate across and within IP law.
We have four tasks in this Article. First, we identify three separate
functionality screens that IP laws use: Filtering, Exclusion, and
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Threshold. Second, we illustrate the use of these different screens in
copyright, trademark, and design patent laws. Each law takes a
different approach to screening functionality. Third, we model the
relative costs and benefits of the different screening regimes, paying

particularattention to administrative and error costs and how these
costs affect incentives and competition. Finally, we assess the current
screening regimes and offer suggestions for how they might be
improved.
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INTRODUCTION

property ("IP") regimes protect various kinds of
invention and creativity in various ways. But most of those regimes do
not protect the function of a product, device, or process. Only utility
patents are supposed to protect function. Copyright, trade dress,' and
design patents all have exceptions or defenses designed to ensure that
the rights they confer do not extend to the functional aspects of a
product.
Preventing non-utility patent IP regimes from protecting function
makes good sense. Conferring market power over function can
significantly restrict the freedom of others to compete, driving up costs
for consumers and limiting access to products. Before the law allows
this, it should have strong evidence that such a powerful IP right is
necessary. Patent law has both a higher threshold for protection and a
shorter term than copyright and trade dress law, and it is harder to get a
utility patent than a design patent.2 Without the ability to screen out
functionality, creators could use copyright, trade dress, or design patent
law to obtain the equivalent of a utility patent without having to do the
work required to get one. The functionality doctrines, then, serve a
channeling function, routing people who want to control function to
utility patent law.
At least, that's the way the law is supposed to work. In practice, the
functionality doctrines are a hodgepodge. Trade dress law has two
different functionality doctrines, and the primary functionality doctrine
3
has two legal standards that seem inconsistent with each other.
Nonetheless, trade dress may actually be the clearest and most
successful of the functionality doctrines. Copyright's functionality rules
differ depending on the subject matter of the copyrighted material, and
4
they have been called a "metaphysical quandary" by one court. Design
patent's functionality doctrine, while ostensibly central to the law, has

We use the terms "trademark" and "trade dress" somewhat interchangeably in referring
to IP protection for product designs. Sorry to the purists this doubtless offends.
2 See infra text accompanying notes 26-50.

3 See infra notes 203-27 and accompanying text.
4 Universal Furniture Int'l v. Collezione Europa

USA, 618 F.3d 417, 434 (4th Cir. 2010)
(finding that decorative elements of furniture design were conceptually separable and
protectable features of a useful article).
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been effectively eliminated as a practical matter by the courts.' A
remarkable example of the divergence in the rules is Apple Inc. v.
Samsung Electronics Co., where the U.S Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit held that the very same iPhone and iPad designs were
functional under trade dress law but were not functional under design
patent law.6
Part of the problem is that Congress and the courts have not
coordinated the various functionality doctrines across different IP
regimes, allowing them to develop in the appropriate ways.' But there is

a more systematic problem. Courts do not even have a consistent way of
thinking about how to screen functionality. We therefore begin by
identifying and classifying the various ways in which IP laws approach

functionality.' Depending on the doctrine and the court, functionality
can be screened out in three distinct ways: first, by excluding the
category of work or design from protection altogether (Exclusion);
second, by granting IP protection but filtering out the functional aspects
of the design in court (Filtering); or third, by creating a minimum
threshold of non-functional content that is required for protection, with

exclusion below the threshold and filtering beyond it (Threshold). We
call these different approaches functionality screens. We then illustrate
how and when copyright, trade dress, and design patent laws use the

different functionality screens (and sometimes more than one within a
legal regime).9

The different functionality screens have significant impacts on the
nature of IP protection. If the regime applies the Exclusion screen, a
work or design receives no protection whatsoever even though it may
contain otherwise non-functional content. By contrast, the Filtering
screen will protect aspects of works or designs that are almost entirely
s See infra notes 226-45.
6 786 F.3d 983, 994, 996, 998-99 (Fed. Cir. 2015), rev'd on other grounds, 137 S.
Ct. 429
(2016).
&

7 Another major problem with functionality in IP doctrines involves the difficulty of
determining what counts as "functional" in the first place. See, e.g., Mark P. McKenna
Christopher Jon Sprigman, What's In, and What's Out: How IP's Boundary Rules Shape
Innovation, 30 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 491, 491-94 (2017). This Article discusses the approaches
various legal rules take to this question in detail below.
8 See infra Part II.

9 See infra

Part III.
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functional as long as they contain some degree of protectable content.
And the Threshold screen produces distinct variation in protection
depending on whether the work or design clears the threshold or not
(and depending on whether the court accurately determines whether it
does).
Next, we offer a theoretical account of when various types of
functionality screens are appropriate.1 0 The choice of functionality
screen should logically relate to the difficulty of identifying functional
elements, the accuracy with which courts can separate functional from
non-functional elements, and how important the functional elements are
in the product. We analyze the administrative and error costs associated
with using the different functionality screens." Finally, we apply our
theoretical account to the law as it exists today, both explaining why
different regimes sometimes use different functionality screens and
finding ways to align the functionality doctrines in various fields with
the costs and benefits of each approach.12 We discuss situations in which
a legal regime is likely using the correct functionality screen and
situations in which a shift to a different screen is appropriate. Our

analysis has implications for a number of legal doctrines, and offers an
early analysis of the recent U.S. Supreme Court case concerning the
copyrightability of cheerleader uniforms, Star Athletica v. Varsity
Brands."
In Part I, we discuss the reasons for the functionality doctrines. In Part

II, we describe the toolbox of what we call "functionality screens." In
Part III, we explore the inconsistent ways in which different IP doctrines
implement functionality rules. Finally, in Part IV we discuss when each
type of screen makes sense, and we evaluate how well various legal
doctrines apply these functionality screens.

10 See infra text accompanying notes 244-73.
" See infra Section I.A.
12 See infra text accompanying notes 288-333.

" 137 S. Ct. 1002 (2017).
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I. WHY SCREEN FUNCTIONALITY IN IP LAW?
In theory, each of the principal fields of IP law protects discrete kinds
of behavior or activity. Utility patent law governs useful inventions, 4
copyright law governs expressive works of authorship," design patent
law covers ornamental features of objects, 16 and trademark law protects
marks or signs that convey the source of goods.'' Indeed, traditionally
the separation was so great that the law required IP owners to
choose one and only one form of IP protection.1 8 This doctrine of
"election" channeled creative activity into the proper IP regime,
and prevented overlap between the laws. 19 Eventually, however, it
proved unworkable for the simple reason that it assumed any given
product was either an invention or a design or a work of authorship.m
In practice, many objects combine aspects of one or more of these
features. Consider, for example, a newly designed desk chair. The chair

14 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) ("Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this
title.").

"5 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012) ("Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title,
in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or
later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated,
either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.").
"35 U.S.C. § 171(a) (Supp. III 2015) ("Whoever invents any new, original and
ornamental design for an article of manufacture may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the
conditions and requirements of this title.").
" 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2012) ("Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or
services, or any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or
device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading
description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which . . . is likely to cause
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association
of such person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her
goods, services, or commercial activities by another person ... shall be liable in a civil
action by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.").
18 In re Blood, 23 F.2d 772, 772 (D.C. Cir. 1927) (holding hosiery label was not entitled to
"double registration").
'9 Id.
20 The doctrine was abandoned in 1974. See Application of Yardley, 493 F.2d 1389, 1394
(C.C.P.A. 1974) (holding that a watch featuring the image of Vice President Spiro Agnew
could be protected by more than one IP regime). For a discussion of how to deal with
overlaps, see Laura A. Heymann, Overlapping Intellectual Property Doctrines: Election of
Rights Versus Selection of Remedies, 17 Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 239 (2013).
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may have an innovative support system that holds the sitter's weight in a
more efficient manner. The support system could potentially receive a
utility patent. The chair might also incorporate a decorative pattern on its
fabric that could be copyrightable. Various aspects of the chair's design
might be ornamentally pleasing such that they could obtain design patent
protection. And the chair's overall design or some feature of it could be
so distinctive that whenever consumers see it they know that it comes
from a particular maker. These features could be subject to trademark
protection.
This example is actually a relatively easy one for IP law because the
different aspects of the chair, such as the patentable support system and
the copyrightable fabric, are distinct and readily identifiable from one
another. But we can easily imagine a situation in which the design of the
support system is simultaneously useful, beautiful, and sourceidentifying. Consumers of the Herman Miller Aeron Chair might be
impressed by its stability and comfort, struck by its appealing visual
form, and able to recognize the design as one sold by Herman Miller.
Or the shape of a Tesla might at the same time improve its aerodynamics
and therefore change the way it drives, be viewed as attractive design,
and signal to passersby that it is in fact a Tesla. In such a case, the
different fields of IP law become intertwined. As products become
increasingly complex, this overlap is more and more common."
The challenge for IP laws, then, involves sorting out how each of
these different legal regimes applies to a product. 23 Incorrect sorting can
have enormous consequences for the efficient functioning of IP systems.
Each of the different fields of IP law enacts a particular set of tradeoffs

2

John R. Berry, Herman Miller: The Purpose of Design 1 (2004).
2 See, e.g., Brandir Int'l v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1143 (2d Cir. 1987)
(considering the functionality of an artistic bicycle rack).
23 See Viva. R. Moffat, Mutant Copyrights and Backdoor Patents: The Problem
of
Overlapping Intellectual Property Protection, 19 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1473, 1474-77 (2004);
Pamela Samuelson, Strategies for Discerning the Boundaries of Copyright and Patent
Protections, 92 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1493 (2017) [hereinafter Samuelson, Strategies for
Discerning]; see, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Why Copyright Law Excludes Systems and
Processes from the Scope of Its Protection, 85 Tex. L. Rev. 1921, 1921-24 (2007)
[hereinafter Samuelson, Why Copyright Law Excludes]; Lloyd L. Weinreb, Copyright for
Functional Expression, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 1149, 1150-54 (1998).
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about the nature of the legal protection that owners receive.24 The

different IP regimes exist to solve different economic problems, so the
rights that owners receive are calibrated to match the nature of those
problems.2 5 Utility patent protection differs from copyright protection,
design patent protection, and trademark protection in a number of

important ways because lawmakers believe that the kinds of activities
associated with each field require particularized treatment.
It is much harder to get a utility patent than to get a design patent,
trademark, or copyright. 26 Copyright protection is essentially automatic

when an author creates a work.27 Trade dress protection can be
automatic when a company adopts a brand, though courts have required
evidence of secondary meaning in an important class of cases (those that
involve the shape of the product itself). 8 Design patents require
examination, but that examination virtually never causes a design patent
to be rejected. 29 Similarly, patents (here including design patents) expire

relatively quickly, while trade dress can theoretically last forever and
copyrights last virtually forever.30 While the balance is certainly not
perfect, the basic idea is that utility patents confer stronger rightsrights over functions-but are correspondingly harder to get and don't
last as long.

24 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual
Property Law 1-10 (2003).
2 Id.; Clarisa Long, Information Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90 Va. L. Rev. 465, 495

(2004).
26 Though perhaps not as hard as it should be. See Mark P. McKenna & Katherine J.
Strandburg, Progress and Competition in Design, 17 Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 1, 2-3 (2013)
(noting that IP can too easily prevent competition in design).
2 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012) ("Copyright protection subsists ...
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression .... ").
28 See infra notes 197-201 and accompanying text.

in original works of

29 See Dennis D. Crouch, A Trademark Justification for Design Patent Rights 7 (Univ. of
Mo. Sch. of Law, Research Paper No. 2010-17, 2010), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1656590
[https://perma.cc/6EGT-3B4B] (finding that 98% of design patent applications are not
challenged for novelty).
30 Copyrights last for the life of the author plus seventy years post mortem for works
created by human authors. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2012). Patents, by contrast, expire after
twenty years. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2012). And trademark rights can be renewed indefinitely as
long as they are in use. 15 U.S.C. § 1059 (2012).
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Consider the contrast between patent and copyright law, for
instance. 31 Patent law establishes a high threshold for inventors. They

must establish that their discoveries had never been known before and
that they were sufficiently clever that ordinary practitioners in the field

were not likely to have thought of them. 32 Copyright law, by contrast,
imposes the lowest of hurdles for rights seekers. To obtain copyrights,

authors must only produce works that are original and that exhibit more
than merely trivial creativity.33 Originality, in the copyright sense, does
not entail novelty; instead, authors can obtain copyrights as long as their
works are original to them, that is, not copied from elsewhere.34 An
author may write a poem or a song that is similar (or even identical) to
other poems or songs, but she can still obtain a copyright as long as she
did not copy it from one of the earlier works. 35 In addition, the creativity
threshold that copyright law applies is meager by comparison to patent
law. Copyright law generally avoids substantial analysis of the aesthetic
value of works and, instead, grants rights to any works that exhibit some
bare modicum of creative spark. 36 For example, while a white pages

&

31 See generally Viva R. Moffat, The Copyright/Patent Boundary, 48 U. Rich. L. Rev. 611,
611-12 (2014) (discussing the contrast between copyright and patent law).
32 On IP thresholds, see Christopher Buccafusco, Zachary C.
Burns, Jeanne C. Fromer
Christopher Jon Sprigman, Experimental Tests of Intellectual Property Laws' Creativity
Thresholds, 92 Tex. L. Rev. 1921, 1926-28 (2014); Joseph Scott Miller, Hoisting
Originality, 31 Cardozo L. Rev. 451, 464, 488-89 (2009); Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex

Stein, Originality, 95 Va. L. Rev. 1505, 1507 (2009).
3 Feist Publ'ns v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) ("Original, as the term is
used in copyright, means only that the work was independently created by the author (as
opposed to copied from other works), and that it possesses at least some minimal degree of
creativity." (citing 1 M. Nimmer & D. Nimmer, Copyright §§ 2.01[A], [B] (1990))).
34 Id. ("Originality does not signify novelty; a work may be original even though it closely
resembles other works so long as the similarity is fortuitous, not the result of copying.").
3 Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1936) ("[I]f by some
magic a man who had never known it were to compose anew Keats's Ode on a Grecian Urn,
he would be an 'author,' and, if he copyrighted it, others might not copy that poem, though
they might of course copy Keats's." (citing Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188
U.S. 239, 249 (1903))). On the independent creation doctrine in copyright law, see generally
Abraham Drassinower, What's Wrong With Copying? (1st prtg. 2015) (discussing the
importance of copying to copyright infringement).
36 Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 251 ("It would be a dangerous
undertaking for persons trained
only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations,
outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits.").
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phonebook may fail to clear this threshold, a yellow pages phonebook of
37
Chinese businesses in New York City can sail over it.
Furthermore, while patent law imposes a substantial, lengthy, and
expensive examination before the Patent Office before rights attach,
38
copyrights vest at the moment the work is created. As soon as a painter
39
sets her brush to the canvas, she obtains a copyright in the painting.
Copyright law does allow for registration, and it requires registration to
commence a lawsuit, but registration is typically pro forma and does not
include substantial examination by the Copyright Office. 40 Moreover,
the copyright registration process is considerably cheaper and quicker
than patent examination.
Copyright law also allows claims of infringement based on less
similarity than patent law. While in some respects copyrights are less
powerful than patents-for instance, they don't prevent independent
development, and they are subject to fair use and other limitations-in
4
other respects copyrights reach more broadly. ' To infringe a patent, a
42
defendant's product must include every element in the patent claim. By
contrast, a work can infringe a copyright while copying less than all of
another work. 43 Indeed, copying only a small fraction of a protected
work can sometimes be enough. 44 In addition, copyright law in some
respects grants original authors greater control over downstream uses of
45
their works than does patent law.

37 See Key Publ'ns v. Chinatown Today Publ'g Enters., 945 F.2d 509, 514 (2d Cir. 1991).
38 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Peter S. Menell & Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property in
the New Technological Age: Perspectives, Trade Secrets and Patents, at III-3 to III-4, III-10
to III-11 (2016 ed.) [hereinafter IPNTA].
9

See 17 U.S.C.

§ 102(a) (2012).

40 E.g., Stef van Gompel, Formalities in Copyright Law: An Analysis of Their History,
Rationales and Possible Future 40 (2011) ("[N]o substantive examination of the
copyrightability of a work is performed before registration.").
41 IPNTA, supra note 38, at IV-9.
42 Id. at III-368.

43 Id. at IV-147.
44 Id.
45 Stefan Bechtold, Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher Jon Sprigman, Innovation
Heuristics: Experiments on Sequential Creativity in Intellectual Property, 91 Ind. L.J. 1251,
1259 (2016); Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property
Law, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 989, 991-92 (1997). The broader power to control derivative works
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Finally, copyrights last much longer than patents. Although patents
and copyrights lasted for similar periods under their respective initial
enactments in 1790,46 copyright terms have grown exponentially. Under
the current 1976 Copyright Act, copyright persists for the natural life of
the author plus an additional 70 years post mortem. 47 For works made
for hire, anonymous, and pseudonymous works, copyright persists for
120 years from the date of the work's creation or 95 years from its
publication, whichever is shorter. 48 Compared to these terms, the 20-year
patent term seems incredibly brief. 49
The substantial differences between copyright law and utility patent
law reflect the different balances that Congress has struck. 50 Anxious
about the anticompetitive effects of exclusive rights in useful inventions,
Congress has established steeper barriers and shorter duration for utility
patents. Although copyright law incorporates some doctrines that
weaken the protection offered to authors-including the idea/expression
distinction, the independent creation doctrine, and fair use-its low
creativity threshold, lack of examination, and lengthy duration project a
different balancing of upstream incentives and downstream access for
expressive works of authorship.
Trademark and design patent laws reflect similar tradeoffs.
Trademarks potentially last forever, giving the creator the possibility of
perpetual protection. 5 ' They can be protected at common law with no
examination at all.52 And inherently distinctive trade dress can be
protected automatically, simply by using the design in commerce."

and improvements is, however, balanced by copyright's fair use doctrine, a doctrine patent

law lacks.
46 Copyrights originally lasted for fourteen years with an additional fourteen-year renewal
term. See Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124, 124 (entitled "An Act for the
encouragement of learning") (repealed 1802). The original patent act limited duration to a
fourteen-year term. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109, 109-12 (repealed 1793).
4 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2012).
48

Id.

§ 302(c).

49 35 U.S.C.

50 Moffat,

§ 154

(2012).

supra note 23, at 1485-87.

51 See 15 U.S.C.

§ 1059(a) (2012).

5 See id. § 1125(a) (providing for an action for infringement even in the absence of
trademark registration).
5 See Two Pesos v. Taco Cabana, 505 U.S. 763, 775-76 (1992).
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While design patents look in some respects more like utility patents,
with examination by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") and
shorter terms, in practice it is much easier to obtain a design patent than
a utility patent. Design patents are rarely rejected or even questioned
based on the existence of other prior designs.54 The overwhelming
majority of design patent applications are granted.55 And they issue
much more quickly than utility patents.56
Trade dress and design patent protection are easier to obtain and (in
the case of trade dress) longer-lasting than utility patents. As with
copyright law, the ease and length of protection are counterbalanced by
significant limitations on the scope of the rights. Design patents are
supposed to cover only ornamental features of products, not their
functional attributes."7 Trade dress protection covers only those aspects
of a design that signal source to consumers, and the law refuses
protection for functional design features even if they signal source. 58 In
addition, courts have restricted the ability of trade dress to protect the
shape or color of a product itself without proof that consumers associate
the design with a particular source. 59 And trademark law permits
competitors to use another's marks to describe their own products or to
make truthful reference to the owner's products.6 0
Patent law protects the functional aspects of a product, by which we
mean things that make a product work at all, or better, or with fewer
defects, or more cheaply. 6' Functionality doctrines exist to prevent
creators from characterizing things that belong in the utility patent realm
as being copyrightable or protectable by design patents or trademarks

54

Crouch, supra note 29, at 7.

55 Id.
56 Id. at 17.
" See 35 U.S.C.
58 See infra notes

§

171(a) (1952) (amended 2012).

198-203.

&

59 Wal-Mart Stores v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 212-14 (2000); Qualitex Co. v.
Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 171-73 (1995).
60 See, e.g., Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, 698 F.2d 786, 796 (5th Cir. 1983).
61 For a detailed discussion of what the law means to include in the functional aspects of a
work protected by patent, as opposed to copyright or trade dress law, see McKenna
Sprigman, supra note 7. McKenna and Sprigman argue that one reason functionality rules in
non-patent IP doctrines are so problematic is that patent law lacks a coherent account of
what it does and does not protect. Id. at 494.
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instead. When aspects of a good are mischaracterized, the carefully
calibrated balancing can fall apart. If we let them, creators will seek
"backdoor patents" by acquiring copyrights, trade dress, or design
patents and then assert those rights against competitors who copy the
functional rather than artistic or source-identifying aspects of their
products. 62 Indeed, this sort of overreach is common in IP cases today. 63
Doing so creates significant social harm, because it interferes with the
norm of free competition in the making of products. 64 Utility patents
carve out an exception to that norm, which is arguably justified by the
need to encourage invention. But copyright, design patent, and trade
dress law, while they have their own purposes, don't need to give
owners control over the functional (as opposed to expressive,
ornamental, or source-identifying) aspects of those products.
The issue is somewhat more complicated than this suggests, because
it is possible that the same aspect of a product can serve both a
functional and a non-functional purpose. 65 Imagine, for instance, that
shredded wheat cereal biscuits both identify the manufacturer and taste
better (or are easier to make) than other shapes. One approach might be
to say that each IP regime can separately protect the functional aspects
of a product-utility patent law because the biscuit design is functional
and trademark law because it also identifies source. In fact, however,
courts have rejected that approach. 66 The risk of a perpetual patent is

62 Smith & Hawken, Ltd. v. Gardendance, Inc., No. C 04-1664 SBA., 2005 WL 1806369,
at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 28, 2005) ("The useful article doctrine serves the important policy of
keeping patent and copyright separate by preventing parties from using copyright to obtain a
'backdoor patent' on a functional article that cannot be patented." (citing 17 U.S.C.

§ 102(b))).

6 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Scope, 57 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 2197,
2281 (2016) (discussing this problem).
6 Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, A Search-Costs Theory of Limiting
Doctrines in
Trademark Law, 97 Trademark Rep. 1223, 1247-49 (2007) [hereinafter Dogan & Lemley,
Limiting Doctrines].
65 This is a particular risk with trade dress law.
Copyright and design patent, by contrast,
have purposes that parallel patent law; it is just that they are trying to encourage the creation
of different things. So it is less likely that the law will need to protect something functional
under design patent law because it is also ornamental. More on this infra notes 70-79 and
accompanying text.
66 TrafFix Devices v. Mktg. Displays, 532 U.S. 23, 33, 35 (2001); Kellogg Co. v. Nat'l
Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 114, 121-22 (1938). For discussion of the oddity of Kellogg as a
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sufficiently great that courts treat an expired utility patent as preempting
efforts to control the patentable aspects of the invention after the patent
expires. 67 The same is arguably true when a technology is eligible but
does not qualify for patent protection, for example because it is
functional but well-known or obvious. Patent law preempts state laws
68
that seek to protect unpatentable inventions. The same should be true
of trademark law. The risk of giving a trademark owner a backdoor
patent is substantial, and the likely benefits of treating a functional
design element as a source identifier are pretty small. After all, many
other, non-functional elements can serve a source-identifying function
instead. If the manufacturer wants consumers to know that the biscuits
come from its company, it can use other text or picture marks to signify
the relationship.
The functionality screens we discuss below serve the valuable
purpose of allowing non-patent IP regimes to have longer terms and
lower thresholds for protection without giving rightsholders control over
competition.69 Design patents, copyright, and trade dress all have such
doctrines. As we will see in the next Parts, however, they diverge widely
in how the courts apply them.
II. FUNCTIONALITY SCREENS

In order to preserve their unique balances of rights and obligations,
copyright, design patent, and trademark law all ostensibly attempt to
exclude the functional features of goods from protection. Yet the
doctrines that they exploit to screen functionality differ. Here, we
identify the three basic techniques non-utility patent IP regimes use to

hybrid generieness-functionality case, see Jake Linford, A Linguistic Justification for
Protecting "Generic" Trademarks, 17 Yale J.L. & Tech. 110, 160-61 (2015).

&

67 TrafFix Devices, 532 U.S. at 33-35.
68 See Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, 489 U.S. 141, 168 (1989); Sears, Roebuck
Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, 376 U.S. 234

(1964).
6 Functionality is not all or even most of what those laws exclude. And some exclusions
for functionality overlap with other doctrines, such as originality or the idea-expression
dichotomy in copyright law. We consider those doctrines only insofar as they affect
functionality. We recognize that they have other purposes for which a different analysis
might apply. And it is important to recognize that not everything that is non-functional is
therefore protected by a particular IP regime.
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avoid protecting functional elements. We call these doctrines
"functionality screens." As we explain in Part III, different IP regimes
use different types of screens in different circumstances. We should
explain, though, that when a particular functionality screen is used, it is
typically applied to a whole field or range of works, designs, or marks.
Courts do not select among them on a case-by-case basis.
To understand the nature of functionality screens in IP, we begin by
proposing a simplified model of product design. Below, we add further
complexity to the model.
Consider the total number of features in a given product that might be
protected by IP law. 70 Some number of these features will be functional
or utilitarian. For example, the engine displacement, crumple zones, and
braking system of an automobile are functional features of the car. Other
features of a product will be aesthetic, ornamental, source-identifying, or
expressive, such as the car's jaguar-shaped hood ornament. We will
refer to these features of product design as non-functional. The goal of
each of the screening doctrines is to prevent designers from attaining
copyright, design patent, or trademark rights in the functional features of
their designs. Only the non-functional features of designs are eligible for
these rights.
We understand that product design is much more complicated than
this. For example, as we discuss below, some design features are
simultaneously both functional and non-functional. 7' In addition, we
understand that "functional" can mean different things in different legal
regimes. We discuss all these complications below. For now, accept that
products can have a mix of features, some of which facilitate the
operation or intrinsic value of the product and others of which do not.
We call the former features "functional" and the latter "non-functional."
In the figure below, we represent the share of a product's total
features that are non-functional in red and the share of a product's total
features that are functional in blue.

70 Some features of a given product might be entirely irrelevant to its design either
functionally or non-functionally. We exclude them here for simplicity. But our unit of
measure, here and throughout this Article, is the product as a whole.
71 See infra notes 78-79.
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The yellow dashed line represents the level of protection, which is
here set at zero for all products. Applying the Exclusion screen is, of
course, incredibly easy for a decisionmaker. Once the decisionmaker
determines that Exclusion applies, no aspects of the product receive
protection. No effort need be made to isolate the product's nonfunctional and functional features. It simply does not receive protection.
As a practical matter, the graph may not perfectly reflect reality. We
don't normally exclude protection altogether for expressive works that
have a high percentage of non-functional content. So while in theory
even a work that had 100% non-functional content would get no
protection under an Exclusion rule, these days Exclusion is likely to be
the rule only for works that tend to have a high percentage of functional
content. 73
B. Filtering
When IP regimes must screen out the functional features of a product,
work, or good from its non-functional features they often engage in what
we call Filtering. Filtering, as its name suggests, involves isolating the
non-functional features of a product from its functional features. The
relevant decisionmaker (whether court, jury, or examiner) determines
which aspects of the product are non-functional and which are
functional. 74 Then, the functional aspects of the product are filtered out,
leaving only the non-functional features. The remaining non-functional
features, and only those features, are then eligible for protection.
Filtering typically results in the creation of a valid right and in
protection for the full range of otherwise protectable non-functional
features of the product. For example, in copyright law, once the
functional features of a work have been stripped away, all of the
remaining aesthetic or expressive features that are original and at least
minimally creative will receive copyright protection.75 We illustrate this
73 That wasn't always true. When copyright law was limited to books, maps, and charts, it
effectively excluded from protection altogether works like paintings that had a high
percentage of expressive content. But copyright didn't do so in order to prevent protecting
functional works. It simply hadn't been extended to other creative works analogous to
"writings." IPNTA, supra note 38, at IV-6.
7 For now, we set aside issues of how and when this filtering is supposed to take place.
We return to this issue in Part IV.
75 See, e.g., Computer Assocs. Int'l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 714, 721 (2d Cir. 1992).

line.

In Filtering, the non-functional/functional curve and the protettion
curve are identical. This means that if Filtering is performed correetiy,
each of the protectable non-functional features of a given product
receives protection, and the scope of that protection extends to the full
range of those non-functional features hut no further For example, a
pioduct that incorporated 90% non-functional features and I 0%
functional features would receive pr otection for the 90% of its featres
that are non-tfuctional. And the insverse is also true, If a product
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Ieatures, it would still obtain some level of protection, but only for the
10% of its design that is non-functional
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design elements that have inseparable functional and non-functional
attributes by giving either full protection or no protection to the
inseparable element. Doing so can create a discontinuity between lesser
and greater protection.
Applying the Threshold screen requires the decisionmaker to
determine where along the non-functional/functional curve the threshold
is to be set." As we will see below, this effort has proved dazzlingly
complicated for courts. In actual litigation, thresholds cannot be set
numerically as in the example above. Instead, the law must establish
some verbal description of the relationship between non-functional and
functional features that indicates where the threshold sits. Next, the
decisionmaker must determine on which side of the threshold the
product lies. The decisionmaker must apply the legally established
threshold to a given product, sorting non-functional features from
functional ones and weighing their contributions to the whole. If the
product falls to the left of the threshold as depicted in Figure 5, the
decisionmaker must filter out the functional features from the nonfunctional ones, allowing protection only for the latter. If, however, the
product falls to the right of the threshold, it receives no protection
whatsoever.
D. Complicatingthe Model: Dual-NatureFeatures
Our simple model of design functionality treats all design features as
either functional or non-functional. But sometimes, individual features
are both functional and non-functional at the same time. The shape of a
Ferrari, for instance, may at the same time make the car go faster, make
it attractive, and signal to the public that it is in fact a Ferrari. Particular
features of a garment design might serve both the aesthetic goal of
looking attractive in their own right and the functional goal of making
the wearer look good.7 8 If those things cannot be separated-if the very

77 The decisionmaker setting the initial threshold is typically Congress. Other subsequent
decisionmakers, including examiners, courts, and juries, must then interpret where Congress
has set the threshold.
78 Brief of Professors Christopher Buccafusco & Jeanne Fromer as Amici Curiae in
Support of Petitioner at 4, 18-19, Star Athletica v. Varsity Brands, 137 S. Ct. 1002 (2017)
(No. 15-866); Christopher Buccafusco & Jeanne C. Fromer, Fashion's Function in
Intellectual Property Law, 92 Notre Dame L. Rev. 12-15 (forthcoming 2017) [hereinafter
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determine what features it will treat as functional before it determines
how it will screen out those functional features.

When copyright, design patent, and trademark laws screen out
functional aspects of works, designs, and products they generally use
one of the three mechanisms described above. These three screening
mechanisms represent the basic toolbox available to prevent the
unwarranted protection of functionality in non-utility-patent IP
regimes.80 In the following Parts, we demonstrate the use of these
mechanisms in the different IP regimes.
III. How FUNCTIONALITY OPERATES IN IP DOCTRINE
In this Part, we review the nature of IP protection in each of these
fields and the reasons why distinctions between them are so important.
A. CopyrightLaw
Copyright law is the province of authorial expression and aesthetic
creativity, and it is the appropriate home for works of literature and the
arts.81 Yet since its inception in the United States, copyright law has also
granted protection to works that are valued in large part due to their
usefulness. The first Copyright Act, in 1790, protected only "maps,
charts, and books." 8 2 And while vintage maps adorn many people's
walls, a map's principal value is to help travelers get where they are
83
going (a particularly important value in our new, uncharted nation).
80 There are some legal rules that don't seem to map to any of these approaches. Design
patents are a notable example. We discuss those pathological approaches below. See infra
notes 225-45 and accompanying text.
81 Michael J. Madison, Beyond Creativity: Copyright as Knowledge Law, 12 Vand. J. Ent.
& Tech. L. 817, 819 (2010) ("To all outward appearances, creativity is the undisputed
'what?' of copyright."). But cf. Barton Beebe, Bleistein, the Problem of Aesthetic Progress,
and the Making of American Copyright Law, 117 Colum. L. Rev. 319, 321 (2017)
(questioning the historical pedigree of applying the constitutional protection for "Science
and useful Arts" to fine art).
82 See Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124, 124-25 (entitled "An Act for the
encouragement of learning") (repealed 1802).
83 Even the books that were most frequently registered in the early republic were of the
useful variety-textbooks, manuals, atlases, and directories. See James Gilreath, American
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But while copyright protection is available for works that have utility,
the legal doctrine should only protect the aspects of those works that are
expressive or aesthetic. Copyright law needs a mechanism to distinguish
the creative aspects of, say, a map that the law protects from the
functional aspects it does not protect.
As we demonstrate below, copyright law employs all three of the
functionality screens-Filtering, Thresholds, and Exclusion-to prevent
granting rights to inappropriate aspects of works. Importantly, which
screen applies depends on the kind of work that the author claims to
have created. As a general matter, many kinds of works are simply
excluded from copyright entirely. Of the works that are included, literary
works are subject to Filtering. With the Supreme Court's recent decision
in Star Athletica v. Varsity Brands, copyright law's treatment of
pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works is in flux. As far as we can tell,
however, there has been little systematic thought about why different
classes of works receive different kinds of treatment. In the following
Sections, we explain when and how each of the screens applies.
1. Literary and Other Works Subjected to FilteringScreens
Works of literature are not typically thought of as being useful.
Reading literature might teach people important moral lessons,8 4 but no
one would think that didactic value of Evelyn Waugh's Brideshead
Revisited should disqualify it from copyright protection. Many literary
works, however, do involve the sorts of usefulness and functionality that
are inappropriate for copyright. 85 Some books teach how to perform
statistical analysis, for example, or explain a new system of
accounting.8 6 Other literary works, such as taxonomies and codes, enable
users to accomplish certain useful tasks.8 7 And computer software,
which copyright law treats as a literary work, is written to instruct the

Literature, Public Policy, and the Copyright Laws Before 1800, in Federal Copyright
Records 1790-1800, at xv, xxii (James Gilreath ed., Elizabeth Carter Willis comp., 1987).
84 See Martha C. Nussbaum, Love's Knowledge: Essays on
Philosophy and Literature

261-62 (1990).
85 Pamela Samuelson, Functional Compilations, 54 Hous. L. Rev. 321, 321 (2016).
86 Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 100
(1879).
87 Samuelson, supra note 85, at 359.
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functioning of machines. 88 In all of these cases, allowing the authors of
the literary works to also gain protection for the functional features of
their works would conflate copyright and patent law, and it would upset
the corresponding balances that the two regimes enact.
These concerns arose most famously in the 1879 case Baker v.
Selden.89 Charles Selden published a book describing a "peculiar system
90
The book included an
of book-keeping" that he developed.
introductory essay explaining the system and a set of forms showing
how the system should be performed. Baker, a competitor, published a
different set of forms in his own book, which described a system very
similar to Selden's. The Supreme Court had to determine whether
Selden's copyright in his book also conveyed the exclusive right to the
use of the bookkeeping system. 9 1
The Court distinguished between the book "as the work of an author,
conveying information on the subject" and the system or art which it is
intended to illustrate. 92 According to the Court, "The copyright of the
book, if not pirated from other works, would be valid without regard to
93
That is, the
the novelty, or want of novelty, of its subject-matter."
merely
were
it
if
copyright
a
receive
could
work
the
in
expression
the
was
contrast,
by
system,
original to the author. The bookkeeping
province of patent law: "The claim to an invention or discovery of an art
or manufacture must be subjected to the examination of the Patent
Office before an exclusive right therein can be obtained . . .. 94 This
examination would feature a determination of whether the invention was
95
truly novel, and in Selden's case, it had not taken place.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) ("A 'computer program' is a set of statements or instructions to
be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result.").
89 101 U.S. at 102.
90

Id. at 100.

9 Id. at 101 ("[T]he question is, whether the exclusive property in a system of bookkeeping can be claimed, under the law of copyright, by means of a book in which that
system is explained?").
92 Id. at 102.

93 Id.

94 Id.
95 It is unlikely that Selden's system would have then fit the appropriate subject matter for
patentability, because it would not have been deemed a machine or manufacture. Patent law
excludes "printed matter" from the scope of protection. Application of Chatfield, 545 F.2d
152, 157 (C.C.P.A. 1976). So the Court's suggestion in Baker that Selden should have
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Importantly, the useful character of Selden's book did not vitiate his
copyright entirely. Selden retained a copyright in the book as a whole
for purposes of explaining the system it described. Yet, the copyright in
the book would not enable him to prevent others from using the system,
which, in this case also meant using the forms in the book.9 6 As the
Court explained, "[W]hilst no one has a right to print or publish his
book, or any material part thereof, as a book intended to convey
instruction in the art, any person may practise and use the art itself
which he has described and illustrated therein." 97 The Court, in effect,
filtered out the unprotectable aspects of Selden's book, leaving him with
a copyright in the remaining, expressive elements of the work.
The current Copyright Act embraces Baker's filtering approach.
Section 102(a) establishes a list of protectable categories of original
authorship. 98 This is followed by Section 102(b), which states: "In no
case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend
to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept,
principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described,
explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work." 99 According to most
courts and scholars, one of the principal purposes of Section 102(b) is to
exclude from copyright law those aspects of works that fall within the
province of patent law-procedures, processes, systems, and methods of
operation.1 00 As in Baker, when an original authorial work also
describes, illustrates, or enacts functional processes, systems, or
methods, the copyright in the work remains, but it does not extend
protection to those processes, systems, or methods. Accordingly, the role
of a court faced with a work that incorporates, describes, or enacts some
function is to construe the scope of the author's copyright such that it

looked to patent law instead was somewhat disingenuous. A more accurate statement would
be that his system of accounting could be protected, if at all, under patent rather than
copyright law.
96 Baker, 101 U.S. at 103 ("[W]here the art it teaches cannot be used without employing
the methods and diagrams used to illustrate the book, ... such methods and diagrams are to
be considered as necessary incidents to the art, and given therewith to the public .....
97 Id. at 104.
98

17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
§ 102(b).

99 Id.

100 See, e.g., Samuelson, Why Copyright Law Excludes, supra note 23, at 1921-22.
Section 102(b)'s other purpose is to establish the so-called idea/expression distinction.
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protects only her original expression and none of its functional
character.101
For literary works, virtually any amount of original expression will
suffice to validate an author's copyright in that expression. For instance,
even in Feist Publicationsv. Rural Telephone Service Co., in which the
court held that an alphabetical listing of names and telephone numbers

was not original and could not be protected, 102 the Court nonetheless

emphasized that Rural Telephone's white pages directory as a whole
was entitled to copyright protection because it had (minimal) written
103
front matter in addition to the list of phone numbers.
Computer software is a prime example of the role of Filtering in
copyright. While the law treats computer code as a literary work-it is
literally written, albeit in a specialized language-software is almost
entirely functional.1 04 It exists, as the definition in the Copyright Act
indicates, to give a computer a set of instructions to bring about a certain
result.10 5 As Pamela Samuelson has repeatedly pointed out, no one buys
software for the expression contained within the code; the value of a
computer program is its function. 106 The code's functional components,
however, are not protectable, so courts must screen them out and focus
only on the remaining expression.107
To screen function from expression in computer code, most courts
apply the "abstraction-filtration-comparison" test initially applied to
software by the Second Circuit in Computer Associates Internationalv.
Altai, Inc.108 Following Baker, the court ruled that the processes
generated by the program and the elements of the program necessary to

101 Lemley & McKenna, supra note 63, at 2226-28.
102
103

499 U.S. 340, 363 (1991).

Id. at 361.

04 Pamela Samuelson, Randall Davis, Mitchell D. Kapor & J.H. Reichman, A Manifesto
Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 2308, 2317
(1994) ("No one would want to buy a program that did not behave, i.e., that did nothing, no
matter how elegant the source code 'prose' expressing that nothing.").
'05 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) ("A 'computer program' is a set of statements or instructions to
be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result.").
106 Samuelson et al., supra note 104, at 2317.
107 Id. at 2350.

108 982 F.2d 693, 706 (2d Cir. 1992).
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bring them about are unprotectable.10 9 Any similarity between these
aspects of the plaintiff's code and the defendant's code would thus not
amount to copyright infringement. To determine liability, then:
[A] court would first break down the allegedly infringed program into
its constituent structural parts. Then, by examining each of these parts
for such things as incorporated ideas, expression that is necessarily
incidental to those ideas, and elements that are taken from the public
domain, a court would then be able to sift out all non-protectable
material. Left with a kernel, or possible kernels, of creative expression
after following this process of elimination, the court's last step would
be to compare this material with the structure of an allegedly

infringing program.

10

This process, and in particular the middle sifting step, allows functional,
and thus unprotectable,'" aspects of the program to run through the
sieve, leaving whatever copyright expression exists to remain. As the
court explains, "[T]his filtration serves the purpose of defining the scope

of plaintiff's copyright."' 1 2
Notice that the court does not expect much copyrightable expression
to be left after the filtration analysis. It refers to it as merely a "kernel,"
and suggests that it may not exist at all. Yet because copyright uses
filtering for literary works, even the smallest kernel of expression will
often support a copyright. As a practical matter, that small kernel of
expression can be important, because it allows the copyright owner to
preclude exact copies of the work even if the vast majority of the work is
functional rather than expressive. But copyright owners often want

109 Id. at 704-05.

"0 Id. at 706.
" The filtration stage also removes unprotectable but non-functional aspects of the code
including unoriginal aspects or features dictated by external factors.
112 Computer Assocs. Int'l, 982 F.2d at 707 (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting
Brown Bag Software v. Symantec Corp., 960 F.2d 1465, 1475-76 (9th Cir. 1992)). This
abstraction-filtration-comparison approach has become the standard way to analyze software
copyrights in almost all circuits. See Mark A. Lemley, Convergence in the Law of Software

Copyright?, 10 High Tech. L.J. 1, 2-3 (1995). The Third Circuit is the sole holdout. Whelan
Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., 797 F.2d 1222, 1238-39 (3d Cir. 1986).
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more, as Computer Associates did-the ability to prevent the creation of
other programs that work in similar ways.'3
Similarly, just because a program or device covers a "method" or
"system" does not mean that it will automatically be excluded from
protection. The law here is not entirely clear, and there may be
variability between the federal circuit courts. In the recent litigation
between Oracle and Google over the copyrightability of the Java
application program interface, Oracle's description of the code as a
1 4
In supporting Oracle's
method did not defeat its copyright claim.
copyright, the Federal Circuit cited a number of cases upholding
5
copyrights in works described as methods." It held, "Section 102(b)
does not . .. automatically deny copyright protection to elements of a
computer program that are functional. . . . Therefore, even if an element
directs a computer to perform operations, the court must nevertheless
determine whether it contains any separable expression entitled to
protection." 16 As long as the author made some choices that were not
entirely dictated by the program's functionality, those choices were
entitled to copyright protection. Although almost all of the purpose and
value of the software were directed towards efficiency and functionality,
the court would still uphold Oracle's copyright if it could find any
meaningful expression."'
113 For a discussion of how to apply the abstraction-filtration-comparison test to
distinguish function from expression, see Pamela Samuelson, Functionality and Expression
in Computer Programs: Refining the Tests for Software Copyright Infringement, 31
Berkeley Tech L.J. 1215, 1223-31 (2017).
114 Oracle Am. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2014). The court noted that
"Sun called the code for a specific operation (function) a 'method."' Id. at 1349.
115 Id. at 1366; see, e.g., Mitel, Inc. v. Iqtel, Inc., 124 F.3d 1366, 1372 (10th Cir. 1997)
("We conclude that although an element of a work may be characterized as a method of
operation, that element may nevertheless contain expression that is eligible for copyright
protection. Section 102(b) does not extinguish the protection accorded a particular
expression of an idea merely because that expression is embodied in a method of operation
at a higher level of abstraction.").
116 Oracle, 750 F.3d at 1367.
117 We are dubious the court got the functionality question right in Oracle. It definitely set
itself at odds with other cases. In contrast, in Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland
International,the First Circuit held that the system of operation could not be copyrighted at
all, even though there were other ways of implementing the same function. 49 F.3d 807, 821
(1st Cir. 1995). Even in that case, however, the result was not that Lotus 1-2-3 got no
copyright protection at all in the computer program, merely that the copyright could not
extend to the system of operation. Id. at 816. For trenchant criticism of Oracle, see, for
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While the result in Oracle America v. Google Inc. is likely factually
and legally incorrect, this approach to screening function in literary
works is consistent across a broad range of subject matter beyond
computer software, and it almost always results in the court finding that
the plaintiff has a valid copyright in at least some aspect of the workthough often not a right as broad as the plaintiff claims. In CCC
Information Services v. Maclean Hunter Market Reports, the Second
Circuit upheld the plaintiffs copyright in an automotive pricing guide
even though it recognized that the plaintiffs decisions were motivated
almost entirely by the guide's utility.1 " Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge
Corp., involving a machine parts numbering system, is the rare case in
which a court, in an opinion by then-Judge Samuel Alito, ruled that the
plaintiffs efforts were "purely functional" and, thus, unprotectable. 119
Filtering is the standard functionality screen for literary works, and, as
we have shown, it almost always results in courts fording that plaintiffs
have valid copyrights in at least some aspects of their works. The
Filtering screen ostensibly removes the functional and utilitarian aspects
of literary works from the scope of the copyrights, leaving authors with
protection for any remaining expressive features of their works. So even
though a work may be 95% functional and only 5% expressive,12 0 the
expressive portion is still entitled to copyright. Importantly, when
applying the Filtering screen, courts are not concerned with whether a
work is "primarily" functional or expressive. Doing so imports a
threshold-based screen where one is not called for."'

example, Samuelson, Strategies for Discerning, supra note 23, at 1513, and Peter S. Menell,
Rise of the API Copyright Dead?: An Updated Epitaph for Copyright Protection of Network
and Functional Features of Computer Software (Univ. Cal. Berkeley Pub. Law Research
Paper No. 2893192, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfi?abstractid=2893192

[https://perma.cc/WWD9-WM3Q].
118 44 F.3d 61, 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1994) ("It is apparent that virtually any independent creation
of the compiler as to selection, coordination, or arrangement will be designed to add to the
usefulness or desirability of his compendium for targeted groups of potential customers, and
will represent an idea.").

119 390 F.3d 276, 284-85 (3d Cir. 2004).
120

121

For an example, see the placement of computer software on the graph in Figure 2 supra.
See, e.g., Bikram's Yoga Coll. of India v. Evolation Yoga, 803 F.3d 1032, 1040 (9th

Cir. 2015) (apparently applying a functionality threshold to yoga, noting that it "primarily
reflects function, not expression").
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Done correctly, Filtering can significantly narrow the effective scope
of copyright for works that are primarily functional in nature while
allowing protection for those works' expressive elements. But it is
important that courts actually engage in filtering out the unprotectable
elements. Some courts have applied vague concepts like "look and feel"
to allow copyright plaintiffs to wave their hands over just what was
protectable about their works.122 Filtering properly requires more. It
requires courts to identify and decline protection for the functional
elements of expressive works. Doing that in turn may require the parties
to specify the particular elements that are expressive in a work that is
also functional. 12 3
Copyright law does not just apply Filtering to literary works. Filtering
is the default screen for copyrightable subject matter, applicable to other
kinds of works such as plays or movies. 12 4 The next Subsection
illustrates how pictorial, graphic, and sculptural ("PGS") works are

subject to Thresholds, and the following Subsection explains how some
classes of works are simply excluded from protection entirely. But if a
work is classified in Section 102(a) as a protectable subject matter, and
if it is not explicitly subject to a functionality threshold as PGS works
are, then courts should apply Filtering.12 ' As we explain below,
architectural works are now subject to Filtering. 12 6 The same should be
true for choreographic works that incorporate some degree of
functionality, such as improving health or muscle tone.1 2 7 And if a

122 Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1970).
123 Some courts have required something similar in trade dress cases. See, e.g., Yurman

Design v. PAJ, Inc., 262 F.3d 101, 116-17 (2d Cir. 2001); Landscape Forms v. Columbia
Cascade Co., 113 F.3d 373, 380-81 (2d Cir. 1997).
124 Samuelson has helpfully categorized the various ways copyrightable compilations can

be functional, and the various types of works that face functionality issues in copyright
outside of PGS works. Samuelson, Functional Compilations, supra note 85, at 321-22.
125 We have not been able to locate any cases involving functionality screening for a
number of the categories of copyrightable works in § 102(a), including musical works,
dramatic works, pantomimes, motion pictures and audio visual works, and sound recordings.
It is certainly possible to imagine that some of these categories, including musical works and
sound recordings, could involve works that are functional.

126 See infra text accompanying notes 188-94.
127 Christopher

&

Buccafusco, Authorship and the Boundaries of Copyright: Ideas,
Expressions, and Functions in Yoga, Choreography, and Other Works, 39 Colum. J.L.

Arts 421, 429 (2016).
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musical composition or sound recording were partially functional-for
example, if the specific notes or sounds operated a machine-then a
court should filter out those features and grant protection to any
remaining original expression.
Copyright filtering does contain an important variation on the
Filtering screen that merits discussion. The "merger doctrine" holds that,
in certain circumstances, where authors have only one or very few ways
of expressing an idea or function, the expression and the idea are
merged, and the expression is treated as unprotectable.12' The merger
doctrine recognizes that circumstances may arise in which authors are
constrained by functionality or efficiency to a highly circumscribed set
of locutions. Granting copyright to the first author to articulate those
expressions would have the effect of giving her an exclusive right to the
function itself. Accordingly, courts have refused to extend copyright to
instructions for hanging draperies,1 29 the rules of games,1 30 directions to
locksmiths for cutting keys,' and, in a sense, the forms in Baker where
their reproduction was a "necessary incident" to the use of the system. 3 1
The merger doctrine, then, is a slight variation of the general Filtering
screen that copyright law applies to literary works. In effect, the merger
doctrine indicates that once the degree of functionality gets so high and
the degree of expression gets so low that subsequent authors will not
meaningfully be able to avoid copyright infringement to achieve a
function, copyright protection ceases. Copyright law's functionality
screen for literary works, then, appears to operate as a Threshold with
the threshold placed to the far right extreme of our model.

128 See Pamela Samuelson, Reconceptualizing Copyright's Merger Doctrine, 63 J.
Copyright Soc'y U.S.A. 417, 417 (2016).
129 Decorative Aides Corp. v. Staple Sewing Aides Corp., 497 F. Supp. 154, 156-57

(S.D.N.Y. 1980).
30 Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, 736 F.2d 485 (9th
Cir. 1984) (game

strategy handbook).
131 Continental Micro v. HPC, Inc., No. 95 C 3829, 1997 WL 309028, at
*1-2 (N.D. Ill.
June 4, 1997).
132 101 U.S. at 103.

fa
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sculptural works were instead subjected to a complex Threshold regime
to determine their validity. 13 4 This regime, known as the "useful articles"
doctrine, has been substantially upended by the Supreme Court's
holding in Star Athletica.'
a. The Useful Articles Threshold Before Star Athletica
In the 1954 case of Mazer v. Stein, the Supreme Court upheld the
copyright in a lamp base that incorporated a sculpture of a dancing
woman. 136 Although the lamp base had features that might have made it
more appropriate for either utility patent or design patent protection, the
Court ruled that Congress was not forbidden from granting copyright
protection to the "work of art" that was included in the object. The Court
found a "contemporaneous and long-continued construction" of
copyright statutes allowing protection for articles having some utilitarian
use.1 37 Copyright under the then-pertinent regulation extended to "works
of artistic craftsmanship, in so far as their form but not their mechanical
38
or utilitarian aspects are concerned."1 Implied in this regulation was the
rule that objects that did not qualify as "works of artistic craftsmanship"
could not obtain any copyright, regardless of their expressiveness.
Whether a work was one of artistic craftsmanship, then, operated as a
threshold for copyrightability. Below this threshold, no protection was
available, but works that cleared it were protected according to their
39
degree of expressiveness using the Filtering screen.1
The 1976 Copyright Act modified but mostly continued the law's
approach to these issues. Rather than protecting "all of the writings of an
author," as the prior act did,14 0 the 1976 Act created specific categories
of protected subject matter. Among these are "pictorial, graphic, and
sculptural works."141 The statutory definition explains:
134

See, e.g., Brandir Int'l v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1145 (2d Cir.

1987).
135 137 S. Ct. at 1016. We discuss StarAthletica in detail below.

136 347 U.S. 201, 217-18 (1954).
37
1 Id. at 213-14.
"3

Id. at 212 (quoting 37 C.F.R. § 202.8 (1949)).

139 See, e.g., id. at 213-14.
140

Copyright Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075, 1076.

141

17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5) (1976).
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Such works shall include works of artistic craftsmanship insofar as
their form but not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects are
concerned; the design of a useful article, as defined in this section,
shall be considered a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work only if, and
only to the extent that, such design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or
sculptural features that can be identified separately from, and are
capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the

article. 142
The first clause explains that, as before, works of artistic craftsmanship
are copyrightable with regard to their form-that is, their degree of
expressive authorship-but that their mechanical or utilitarian features
must be filtered out of their scope. 143 The second clause, however, added
a new wrinkle. According to the House Report on the 1976 Act, the
second clause seeks "to draw as clear a line as possible between
copyrightable works of applied art and uncopyrighted works of
industrial design." 144
Thus, if a PGS work qualifies as a "useful article" it should receive
different treatment as a matter of copyright validity. The work will be
subjected to a determination of whether its aesthetic features "can be
identified separately from, and are capable of existing independently of,
the utilitarian aspects of the article."14 ' This has become known as the
separability criterion. The separability doctrine is designed to deal with
functional-aesthetic hybrids in which the same element both serves a
functional purpose and is expressive. As noted above, when the same
element is both functional and non-functional the law cannot separate
the two and protect only the element's expressiveness.1 46 The law must
decide to protect the element despite its functionality or refuse to protect
it despite its expressiveness. Copyright law typically denied protection
to the dual-nature features of PGS works in such circumstances.1 47

142 Id. § 101 (2012).
143 The House Report refers to this as "classic language." H.R. Rep.
No. 94-1476, at 54-55

(1976), as reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5667-68.
144 Id. at 5668.

41 17 U.S.C. § 101.
146 See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
47

See, e.g., Brandir Int'l v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1145 (2d Cir.

1987).
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Works falling to the left of the dashed line are not useful articles, and
they are protected by a Filtering regime. The purely expressive features
of a painting or drawing are protected, as are any dual-nature features of
the work, but its purely functional features, including its ability to cover
holes in the wall, are screened.
If a work falls to the right of the line and constitutes a useful article,
the next step of the analysis has been to apply the separability criterion.
As noted above, this requires the court to determine whether pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural features of the work can be identified separately
from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects
of the article. Thus, the court must determine which parts of the work
are purely aesthetic features, which parts are purely utilitarian aspects,
and which parts are dual-nature, those that simultaneously exhibit
aesthetics and functionality. Although the nature of this inquiry is not
entirely clear, the best reading of the statute treats as "utilitarian aspects"
any components of the work that do not "merely ... portray the
appearance of the article or . . . convey information."" 0
Having analyzed the components of the work, the court can now
apply the separability criterion by asking whether the aesthetic features
can be identified separately from, and are capable of existing
independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article. That is, the court
will ask whether the useful article exhibits any purely aesthetic features.
These features, and only these features, can receive copyright protection.
In some cases, this inquiry is easy, because the aesthetic features can be
physically removed from the useful article. For example, the sculpted
hood ornament on a Jaguar automobile can simply be removed from the
carts leaving both a sculpture and a car. Here, the aesthetic features are
said to be "physically separable."1 2
In other cases, however, the aesthetic features cannot be removed
from an article. Nonetheless, courts typically hold that the aesthetic
features of useful articles may still be copyrightable if they are
"conceptual[ly] separable."15 3 Here, in particular, courts and scholars

"5 Id. (defining "useful article"); Buccafusco & Fromer, Fashion's Function, supra
note

78, at 39.
151

Too simply, if you're not careful.

152 Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1014 (emphasis
omitted).

153 Id. (emphasis omitted).

n
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Cases from the federal appellate courts in the decades since the
adoption of the 1976 Act support this reading. In CarolBarnhartInc. v.
Economy Cover Corp., the court concluded that department store
mannequin torsos were unprotectable, not because there was no artistry
that went into their design, but because the mannequins' features were
inevitably bound up in their functional purpose of displaying
garments.' 56 So too in BrandirInternationalv. Cascade Pacific Lumber
Co., where the court denied copyright protection to an aesthetically
pleasing, award-winning bicycle rack because, although its shape may
have been beautiful, it was also related to its ability to successfully hold
and protect bicycles.1 7 Protection was appropriate in Kieselstein-Cordv.
Accessories by Pearl, however, because certain features of the plaintiff's
decorative belt buckles played no part whatsoever in their function.
58
Certain aspects of their shape were merely aesthetic.1
b. FunctionalityScreeningAfter Star Athletica
The Supreme Court's holding in Star Athletica has fundamentally
altered the way that copyright law screens functionality for PGS works.
The case involved the copyrightability of simple designs on cheerleader
uniforms, such as chevrons that emphasized the breasts and
deemphasized the waist. 159 The district court held that the designs were
not copyrightable because they were inseparably functional, but the
Sixth Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court agreed with the Sixth
Circuit. 160 In doing so, however, the Court's opinion wreaks two major
changes on the useful articles doctrine: it eliminates the threshold
Congress imposed between useful and non-useful articles, and it alters
the treatment of dual-nature features, which are now potentially
protectable.

156

773 F.2d 411, 419 (2d Cir. 1985).

157 834 F.2d at 1146-48.

158 632 F.2d 989, 993 (2d Cir. 1980).
159 See Buccafusco & Fromer, Fashion's Function, supra note 78.
160 Star A thletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1005-06.
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or not. Next we must ask whether these features have the capacity to
163
They do if they
exist apart from the utilitarian aspects of the article.
or sculptural
graphic,
are "able to exist as [their] own pictorial,
164
work . .. once [they are] imagined apart from the useful article."
Notably, they need not be physically separable. The PGS features are
protectable simply if they can be depicted in some medium other than
165
that of a useful article.
While much of the Court's opinion remains mysterious-including
how to determine whether a feature is functional or not, or even whether
66
variation from
a court should engage in that inquiry at all' -its
rejected the
Court
accepted doctrine is fairly clear. For example, the
notion that only "solely artistic features" of a useful article are
protectable.1 67 The Court explained that a feature could be considered
68
Once the PGS
separable "even if it makes [the] article more useful."
there is no
article,
features are imagined away from the useful
requirement, according to the opinion, that what is "'left behind' ... be
a fully functioning useful article at all, much less an equally useful
one."

169

Because Star Athletica does not consider the language of Section 101
requiring protection only for non-functional aspects of the design, it is
possible that courts will treat the new conceptual separability test only as
a first step in the functionality inquiry. While virtually everything will
be separable under the Court's new test, courts may-indeed, should-

163 Id. The Court notes that this requirement is "ordinarily more difficult to satisfy." Id. We
assume that it means "ordinarily" in the sense that all previous cases had imposed a more
rigorous standard than the one applied here. E.g., BrandirInt'l, 834 F.2d at 1147.
164 StarAthletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1010.
165 Id. at 1011 (explaining "[t]he ultimate separability question, then, is whether the feature
for which copyright protection is claimed would have been eligible for copyright protection
as a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work had it originally been fixed in some tangible
medium other than a useful article").
166 Although the Court's opinion addresses § 101's definition of "pictorial, graphic, and
sculptural works," it astonishingly doesn't address that Section's definition of "useful
articles," or the portion of the statute that makes clear that those articles are protectable only
"insofar as their form but not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects are concerned." 17

U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
167 Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1014 (internal quotation marks omitted).

168 Id.

169 Id.
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Athletica with the rest of copyright law is that while there won't be
much, if any, filtering under the conceptual separability rubric, courts
can and will filter out functional elements on other grounds, like the
idea-expression dichotomy and the exclusion of "processes" and
"systems" under Section 102(b).1 7 1 So we might apply a pure Filtering
approach, just as we would for literary works. The practical effect of that
approach may be that PGS works end up getting no less protection than
any other type of copyrighted work, contrary to what Congress intended.
But under this approach, at least they wouldn't get more protection.
3. Exclusionfrom CopyrightProtection
Copyright law's use of Filtering and Thresholds are fairly clear in the
fields to which they apply. Courts are explicit about their use of Filtering
in computer software cases, and the Copyright Act mandates a version
of a Threshold screen for PGS works. 172 Less obvious, however, is
copyright law's use of Exclusion as a functionality screen. This is
because the evidence for Exclusion is typically the absence of formal
copyright protection for certain kinds of works. The law does not
necessarily indicate that some works are excluded, but because they are
not affirmatively granted protection, they are effectively excluded.
Perhaps the easiest way to illustrate Exclusion is to examine situations
in which classes of works were first granted statutory protection. For
example, photographs were first granted copyrights in 1865.13
Previously, photographic creativity was simply excluded from the realm
of copyright protection. The same is true of sound recordings prior to
their incorporation into the law in 1972.14 In these and other cases, the
kinds of creativity that eventually received protection presumably
qualified as constitutional writings of authors before their grant of
federal copyright protection. But the statute did not protect them.
735, at 4,20 (1990), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 6951. The House Report went on
to define a functionality inquiry for architectural works that was presumably narrower than
that for useful articles, but which now looks very much like the optimistic vision of Star
Athletica.
17
172

17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
Id. § 101.

173 Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 126, § 1, 13 Stat. 540, 540.
174 Act of Oct. 15, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391; H.R. Rep. No. 92-487, at 4
(1971), reprintedin 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1567, 1570.
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It is not always easy to tell what kinds of works fall between the outer

boundary set by the Constitution and the inner boundary established by
the Copyright Act. Culinary creativity in the form of developing original
dishes is excluded from copyright protection. A written recipe may, in
limited circumstances, obtain protection as a literary work, but that
would not entitle the author to rights in the dish as cooked and served. 175

And some creators have claimed that prepared dishes could constitute
sculptural works, but they have had no success with these claims in the
courts.17 6 To the extent that any rationale is offered for excluding dishes
from copyright protection, it often refers to food's inherent
functionality. 177 According to many who have written about food and
IP,' 7 8 creativity in the production of tastes and smells is more like
patentable utility than copyrightable expression.1 9 Whether true or not,
the effect of the Exclusion screen in copyright law is to prevent even the
expressive aspects of cooking from obtaining protection. With food, the
law does not filter for residual expression or assess whether the degree
of expression meets a certain threshold; it simply jettisons the work from
copyright protection.
The same effect applies to certain kinds of dance and bodily
movement. Although the Copyright Act protects choreographic works,
the legislative history explains that Congress intended to narrowly
circumscribe the protection offered to only certain kinds of dances.180 To
be protectable, choreographic works are those intended to be performed

175 Lorenzana v. S. Am. Rests. Corp., 799 F.3d 31, 34 (1st Cir. 2015) (denying copyright
protection to a chicken sandwich); Publ'ns Int'l, Ltd. v. Meredith Corp., 88 F.3d 473, 482

(7th Cir. 1996).
176 Kim Seng Co. v. J & A Imps., 810 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1053 (C.D. Cal. 2011).
177

178 For a sample of this scholarship, see Christopher
J. Buccafusco,

On the Legal
Consequences of Sauces: Should Thomas Keller's Recipes Be Per Se Copyrightable?, 24
Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 1121 (2007); Emmanuelle Fauchart & Eric von Hippel, NormsBased Intellectual Property Systems: The Case of French Chefs, 19 Org. Sci. 187 (2008).
179 See Publ'nsInt'l, Ltd., 88 F.3d at 480-82; Kim Seng Co., 810 F. Supp. 2d
at 1053.
180 U.S. Copyright Office, Compendium
of U.S. Copyright Office Practices § 805.1 (3d ed.
2014) (noting that "[t]he legislative history for the 1976 Copyright Act clearly states that
'choreographic works' do not include social dance steps and simple routines" (quoting H.R.
Rep. No. 94-1476, at 54 (1976), reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5667; S. Rep. No. 94473, at 52 (1975) (internal quotation marks omitted))).
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for an audience.' 8' Social dance steps performed by a couple are
excluded.1 2 So too are aspects of expressive bodily movement that do
not qualify as "dance." This could include choreography designed to
influence how the performer's body feels rather than how the
performer's body is perceived by an external audience. For example,
there might be substantial expressive creativity in the design of a yoga

routine, but that creativity would not receive protection because it does

183
As with
not meet the statutory definition of a choreographic work.
culinary dishes, the amount of expressive creativity in a yoga sequence
might be substantial (and substantially greater than in a computer
program), but application of an Exclusion screen completely eliminates
184
the opportunity for copyright protection.

4. Coda-Architecture
We conclude our analysis of functionality screening in copyright law
with an exploration of architectural copyrights. We do so because
architectural creativity has been subjected to each of the three different
functionality screens that we identify. Observing their operation in the
same realm can, accordingly, help clarify their differences, including the
important normative differences between the three regimes.
Throughout most of the history of U.S. copyright law, architectural
85
Architectural drawings and
creativity received limited protection.1
plans were subject to copyright protection as pictorial or graphic works
under the 1909 and 1976 acts, but the authors' exclusive rights only
86
Copyright law did not
prevented others from copying their plans.
or similar buildings as
identical
prohibit other architects from building

181 Id.
182 Id.

§ 805.2(E).
§ 805.2(F).

183 Buccafusco, supra note 127, at 424.

184 The shape of clothing too has traditionally been held to be outside the subject of
copyright protection, though Star Athletica likely changes that. Nonetheless, plaintiffs often
bring copyright claims in areas that theoretically carry little or no copyright protection. Ben
Depoorter finds that more than a quarter of all cases in which copyright owners sought
damages were in the areas of fashion, architecture, or industrial design. Ben Depoorter,
Damage Intimidation, 22 tbl.5 (2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
185 David E. Shipley, Copyright Protection for Architectural Works, 37 S.C. L. Rev. 393,

395-96 (1986).
186 Id. at 395.
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long as they did not actually copy protected drawings. 187 To the extent
that aspects of a building were protectable at all, they had to satisfy the
conceptual separability standards discussed above. 188 While an
occasional gargoyle or visual motif might receive copyright protection,
the creativity involved in designing and constructing buildings did not.
Decisions about the layout of rooms, for example, were uniformly
treated as, at most, aesthetic choices that were inseparable from
function. 189
This situation changed with the adoption of the Architectural Works
Copyright Protection Act of 1990 ("AWCPA"), which the United States
enacted in order to be in compliance with the international Berne
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works. 90 The Act
added the category of "architectural works" to Section 102(a), granting
authors protection for their original buildings and not just for the plans
used to create them. In so doing, however, Congress made two important
decisions that are relevant to our inquiry. First, buildings would not be
subjected to the rigorous conceptual separability analysis applied to PGS
works. 19' Instead, architectural works are protectable if they have any
"original design elements" that are not "functionally required." 92 Thus,
Congress applied a Filtering screen to architectural works that allows
authors to obtain a valid copyright on their buildings if they demonstrate
copyrightable expression. Now, works that never would have passed the
separability test will be protected, at least to the extent that they exhibit
187 David E. Shipley, The Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act at Twenty: Has
Full Protection Made a Difference?, 18 J. Intell. Prop. L. 1, 22-24 (2010).
188 Id. at 3-4.

189 For an endorsement of this limited approach as a solution to Arrow's information
paradox that did not encumber later architectural creation, see Kevin Emerson Collins, The
Hidden Wisdom of Architectural Copyright Before the AWCPA: Defeasible Intellectual
Property, 1-8 (Washington Univ. in St. Louis Legal Studies Research Paper No. 15-09-01,
2017), https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2655743
[https://perma.cc/P2
Q5-9ZSC].
190 17 U.S.C.

§§ 102(a), 120 (2012).

191 See Clark Proffitt, Note, Poetry or Production: Functionality in the Architectural Works

Copyright Protection Act, 39 Ariz. St. L.J. 1263, 1274 (2007) ("The definition of a useful
article was not amended by the legislation, but by defining architectural works as a category
separate from pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works, the separability test would
automatically cease to apply.").
192 H.R. Rep. No. 101-735, at 20-21 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6935,

6951-52.
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appropriate expression. 193 This switch from a Threshold to a Filter
substantially expanded the realm of protectable works.
Second, when Congress defined the scope of the works that would be
protected as architectural works, it granted protection only to the
architectural design of buildings. The House Report clarifies that the
term "buildings" refers only to structures typically inhabited by humans,
including houses, office buildings, and churches.1 94 Works of
architectural creativity that do not qualify as buildings-bridges,
overpasses, gardens-are excluded from protection altogether.195
Although a bridge may exemplify substantially greater architectural
expression and creativity than a suburban home or office park, the
bridge will not qualify for copyright protection but the home or office

park might.
Architectural copyrights bring into stark relief the differences
between the three screening regimes that copyright law applies. The
change from a Threshold to a Filter for buildings substantially increased
the number of works that could receive valid copyright protection.
Instead of rejecting almost all aspects of architectural creativity, the
AWCPA allows almost all buildings to receive some degree of
protection. Nonetheless, functionality screening still must take place,
and courts must determine which aspects of an architectural work are
expressive and which are functional. And now they must do this for a
significantly larger class of works. Determining copyright protection for
non-building architectural creativity is, however, much easier-there
isn't any. The Exclusion screen means that once a court determines that
the claimed work is not a building, 196 it can dispense with further
analysis. The work is not protected. As we explain in greater detail in
Part IV, the different screening regimes have distinct costs and benefits
193 See Richmond Homes Mgmt. v. Raintree, Inc., 862 F. Supp. 1517, 1523 (W.D. Va.

1994), aff'd in part, and rev'd in part, 66 F.3d 316 (4th Cir. 1995). ("If a house design is
sufficiently original, copyright protection is not precluded because the design is also
utilitarian.").
194 H.R. Rep. No. 101-735, at 20 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 6951;

see also 37 C.F.R. § 202.11(b)(2) (2011).
195 See, e.g., Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290, 292 (7th Cir. 2011); 37 C.F.R.
§ 202.11(d)(1) (2011).
196 This is not always an easy task. See Yankee Candle Co. v. New England Candle Co.,
14 F. Supp. 2d 154, 159-61 (D. Mass. 1998) (holding that the design of a store within a mall
does not constitute a "building" under the Copyright Act).
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in terms of error costs and judicial resources. We will return to
architectural works below to further illustrate the nature of these
arguments for choosing one regime over another.
B. Trademarkand Trade Dress Law
Trademark law differs from other forms of IP because it is not
designed to encourage the creation of new brands or marks, but instead
to protect consumers from confusion by cementing the sourceidentifying function of marks.1 97 Allowing consumers to be comfortable
in identifying brands as associated with specific products in turn allows
for a functioning market free of deception.'"
Consistent with that focus, trademark law protects primarily words,
images, and logos that serve as brands. But trademark law has
recognized that sometimes the shape, color, or packaging of a product
itself can also serve a source-identifying function.19 9 The canonical case
is the green-gold color of a dry-cleaning pad, which was both distinctive
and had come, over time, to be associated with a particular manufacturer
of dry-cleaning pads. 200 Protection for source-signifying aspects of
product design is known as "product configuration" protection,
sometimes used interchangeably with "trade dress" protection.2 0 1

197 See, e.g., Landes & Posner, supra note 24, at 167-68; Nicholas Economides,
Trademarks, in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law 602, 602 (Peter
Newman ed., 1998) [hereinafter Economides, Trademarks] (describing the savings for
consumers in product searches as one of "[t]he primary reasons for the existence and
protection of trademarks"); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer
Search Costs on the Internet, 41 Hous. L. Rev. 777, 786-87 (2004); Nicholas S.
Economides, The Economics of Trademarks, 78 Trademark Rep. 523, 525-27 (1988)
(discussing the economic benefits of marks that apprise consumers of products'
unobservable features).
198 Cf. Dogan & Lemley, Limiting Doctrines, supra note 64, at 1223-27 (arguing that
lowering consumer search costs through trademarks facilitates the functioning of a
competitive marketplace); Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark
Law, 82 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1839, 1841-42 (2007) (arguing that trademark law before the
twentieth century was based on unfair competition rather than consumer protection, but
noting that they are both serving similar goals in protecting a functioning market).
199 Two Pesos v. Taco Cabana, 505 U.S. 763, 765 (1992).
200 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 166 (1995).
201 Strictly speaking, trade dress protection can apply either to the product configuration
itself or to the packaging of the product. In this Article, we refer to the subset of trade dress
protection that covers product configurations.
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trade dress is non-functional. 204 A product feature is functional if that
feature is "essential to the use or purpose of the article or if it affects the
cost or quality of the article." 205 While that sounds like a two-part test, in
fact the first part is entirely swallowed by the second. The first part,
known as the "competitive necessity" test, is a narrow rule that would
allow trademark owners control over a variety of functional elements, so
206
long as there was more than one possible way of making a product.
But as a practical matter, modern utilitarian functionality doctrine is
dictated by the limitation that a product feature is not protectable if it
"affects the cost or quality of the article." 207
The Supreme Court's opinion in TrafFix Devices v. Marketing
Displays208 is an excellent example of this analysis. The plaintiff was the
maker of a road construction sign that included a dual-spring design that
had previously been subject to a utility patent. During the period of
patent protection, the design had allegedly become a signal to consumers
that the sign was produced by the plaintiff. Despite the design's sourcesignifying ability, the Court ruled that the plaintiff could not use
trademark law to protect its design because the springs were designed to
make the signs more stable in wind. 209 There were other ways to make
road signs, but that didn't matter, because this one arguably worked
better. In fact, though, it wasn't critical to the decision that it be better
than the alternatives. It was sufficient that it worked differently, so that

204

15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(5) (2012).

205 TrafFix Devices v. Mktg. Displays, 532 U.S. 23, 24 (2001) (quoting Qualitex, 514 U.S.

at 165) (internal quotation marks omitted).
206 In re Morton-Norwich Prods., 671 F.2d 1332, 1339 (C.C.P.A. 1982). For an argument
that would broaden it, see Mark P. McKenna, (Dys)functionality, 48 Hous. L. Rev. 823,

848-60 (2011).
207 See, e.g., Arlington Specialties v. Urban Aid, 847 F.3d 415, 419 (7th Cir. 2017)
(quoting TrafFix Devices, 532 U.S. at 32) (internal quotation marks omitted); Groeneveld
Transp. Efficiency v. Lubecore Int'l, 730 F.3d 494, 505 (6th Cir. 2013) (finding functionality
because "all the elements of Groeneveld's pump are there for some practical benefit or
reason.... Groeneveld has not presented its pump as in any way the equivalent of an
automotive tail fm-a purely ornamental feature that contributes no demonstrable benefit to
the operation or efficiency of the designed product" (alteration in original)); Specialized

Seating v. Greenwich Indus., 616 F.3d 722, 726-27 (7th Cir. 2010).
208 532 U.S. at 23.
209 Id. at 33-34.
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granting trade dress protection would deprive customers of competitive
choice between different products of different quality. 21 0
Importantly, though, the Court distinguished the spring design from
other possible product configuration features that would be "arbitrary,
incidental, or ornamental." 21 1 Such features, including "arbitrary curves
in the legs or an ornamental pattern painted on the springs," could serve
as protectable trade dress, because they are purely non-functional.2 12
According to this reasoning, the utilitarian functionality doctrine in trade
dress law is a form of Filtering screen, albeit a specialized one. If a
product configuration is functional-whether purely functional or dual-

nature-it is screened out and receives no protection. It doesn't matter
that that feature is also source-signifying. If it affects the cost or quality

of the product, trade dress law won't protect it.213 That said, the Filtering
210 Id.; Arlington Specialties, 847 F.3d at 420 (finding that plaintiff cannot
protect one of
several different designs that present different choices to customers and that "[t]hese
different design features present alternative functional designs with different advantages and
disadvantages that have nothing to do with the source of a particular product").
As the Groeneveld court explained, it does not matter under TrafFix Devices that other
designs are available to competitors. Focusing on the possibility of doing something a
different way "would result in a reversion to the very standard that the Supreme Court
unanimously rejected in TrafFix Devices .... [C]ompetitive necessity is an appropriate
avenue of inquiry, the Supreme Court held, only in cases of 'esthetic functionality,' not in
cases of utilitarian functionality .... " Groeneveld, 730 F.3d at 505-06 (quoting Traffix
Devices, 532 U.S. at 33).
Much of the confusion in the scholarly literature about the test for functionality after
TrafFix Devices can be traced to a failure to appreciate that cost or quality, not competitive
necessity or the presence of alternatives, is the proper test for functionality. See, e.g., Justin
Hughes, Cognitive and Aesthetic Functionality in Trademark Law, 36 Cardozo L. Rev.
1227, 1234 (2015); Sandra L. Rierson, Toward a More Coherent Doctrine of Trademark
Genericism and Functionality: Focusing on Fair Competition, 27 Fordham Intell. Prop.
Media & Ent. L.J. 691, 715-17 (2017); cf. Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Death of Ontology: A
Teleological Approach to Trademark Law, 84 Iowa L. Rev. 611, 645-47 (1999) (criticizing
the doctrine of aesthetic functionality).

&

2 TrafFix Devices, 532 U.S. at 34.
212 Id.
213 See, e.g., Talking Rain Beverage Co. v. S. Beach Beverage Co.,
349 F.3d 601, 603-05
(9th Cir. 2003); Dogan & Lemley, Limiting Doctrines, supra note 64, at 1247 ("Even when
consumers have come to associate a particular product feature with a single seller, that
feature cannot serve as a trademark if exclusive use of it would put competitors at a nonreputation-related disadvantage."). This creates significant problems of scope when features
are both source-identifying and functional. Courts struggle with whether to take seriously the
exclusionary nature of the screen, and they don't always get it right. See Lemley
McKenna, supra note 63, at 2257-59; McKenna, supra note 205, at 856-57.
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screen here operates differently than it does in some of the copyright
examples we discussed above. Any product element that is functional is
excluded from protection. And most cases, like TrafFix Devices, that
14
find functionality end up giving no protection to the product shape.
But where a particular aspect of a product can be separated from the
functional elements, that aspect can be protected despite the
functionality of other aspects. Thus, the plaintiff in Qualitex Co. v.
Jacobson Products Co.2 15 can protect the green-gold color of its dry
cleaning pad, even though it cannot protect the shape or composition of
the pad. And the designer of a car can protect certain ornamental
features that identify source, like the hood ornament, even though the
216
overall shape of the car is heavily dictated by function. Thus, the trade
dress standard is similar in practice to the useful articles analysis
copyright law applies to PGS works. Trademark law is supposed to
allow protection only for features that can be separated from the
functional aspects of the product.2 1 Unlike the useful articles analysis,
214 Traffix Devices, 532 U.S. at 29.
215 514 U.S. 159 (1995).
216 Even where the two cannot be separated, and the Exclusion screen therefore bars trade
dress protection, courts will sometimes look for other mechanisms to reduce any resulting
confusion. As Dogan and Lemley explain:
Unlike genericide, a sliding scale is harder to imagine with functional products
because the consumer interest in use of the product is not simply avoiding confusion
as to source, but access to the product itself. But that doesn't mean that nothing can be
done to limit the potentially confusing consequences of a finding of functionality. As
with some cases involving generic marks, some courts have responded to these risks
not by prohibiting use of the feature, but by requiring competitors to "use reasonable
care to inform the public of the source of [their] product[s]." To the extent that the use
may even then mislead some members of the public, the functionality doctrine
presupposes that the harm to consumers in these cases is outweighed by the greater
availability of competitive products in the first place. Given what is at stake, that
seems to us the right balance.
Dogan & Lemley, Limiting Doctrines, supra note 64, at 1248-49 (quoting Gum, Inc. v.
Gumakers of Am., 136 F.2d 957, 960 (3d Cir. 1943)) (footnote omitted); see also Am.
Greetings Corp. v. Dan-Dee Imps., 807 F.2d 1136, 1141 (3d Cir. 1986) ("[I]f the functional
feature or combination is also found to have acquired secondary meaning, the imitator may
be required to take reasonable steps to minimize the risk of source confusion."); cf. Am.

Fork & Hoe Co. v. Stampit Corp., 125 F.2d 472, 475 (6th Cir. 1942) ("[I]n order to establish

&

even the limited right of compelling appellant to take positive steps to avoid confusion, the
existence of secondary meaning must plainly appear.").
217 Unfortunately, this doesn't always happen. In In re Hershey Chocolate
Confectionary Corp., No. 77809223, 2-3, 9-10 (T.T.A.B. 2012), for instance, the Trademark
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with utility patents, but with copyrights and design patents.22 0 The
Lanham Act "does not protect the content of a creative work of artistic
expression" because an "artist's right in an abstract design or other
creative work" is protected by copyright law.22 1
The problem, though, is that it is frequently much harder to separate
attractiveness and brand identification than it is to separate the utilitarian
features from the source-identifying ones. While some companies
choose unattractive product features to distinguish their products-think
of the green-gold dry cleaning pad-most companies want their
products to be both attractive and distinctive. As a result, the test for
aesthetic functionality is somewhat less strict than for utilitarian
functionality. It prohibits protection only if denying a competitor a
design would put that competitor at a "significant non-reputation-related
disadvantage." 22 2 Courts and commentators have struggled to apply this
standard. 2 3 That may be in part because they don't really understand the
concept of aesthetic functionality. Some courts seem reluctant to exclude
attractive design from trade dress protection merely because it is
attractive. 2 4 That is, however, what a strong form of aesthetic
functionality would require. And even the weaker "significant
disadvantage" test requires that at some point the value of the design is
primarily aesthetic rather than source-identifying. At that point, aesthetic
functionality should preclude protection. Trade dress should not, for
instance, be used to control a style of painting.m
20 On

channeling between copyright and trademark law, see generally Laura A. Heymann,

The Copyright/Trademark Divide, 60 SMU L. Rev. 55, 67-74, 76-83 (2007).
2 EMI Catalogue P'ship v. Hill, Holliday, Connors, Cosmopulos Inc., 228 F.3d 56, 63
(2d Cir. 2000) (citing United States v. Giles, 213 F.3d 1247, 1252 (10th Cir. 2000)).
2 TrafF'ixDevices, 532 U.S. at 33; Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 17 cmt.
c, 175-76 (Am. Law Inst. 1993) ("The ultimate test of aesthetic functionality ... is whether
the recognition of trademark rights would significantly hinder competition.").
223 See, e.g., McAirlaids, Inc. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 756 F.3d 307, 312-13 (4th Cir.
2014) (holding that whether a pixel pattern on fabric was aesthetically functional was a
disputed question of fact); Dinwoodie, supra note 210, at 693-94.
2 See, e.g., Bd. of Supervisors of La. State Univ. Agric. & Mech. Coll. v. Smack Apparel
Co., 550 F.3d 465, 486-87 (5th Cir. 2008) (refusing to treat the use of school colors on tshirts as aesthetically functional even though purchasers wanted shirts with school colors to
signal affinity with the school, not because they indicated the source of t-shirts).
2 Dogan & Lemley, Limiting Doctrines, supra note 64, at 1248 ("Many goods are
purchased on aesthetics in whole or in part. Allowing someone who develops an attractive

style of painting or a sleek design for a product to prevent others from using it interferes with
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Aesthetic functionality, like utilitarian functionality, is (at least in
theory) a Filtering screen. Courts should protect aesthetic elements
under trade dress law unless doing so puts competitors at a disadvantage
by locking up the pleasing designs or colors. But as with copyright's
merger doctrine, compared to utilitarian functionality, the aesthetic
functionality threshold is pretty generous to the IP owner. The product
must be primarily attractive rather than source-identifying before the
doctrine will preclude protection altogether.
C. Design PatentLaw
Design patents are intended to protect the ornamental aspects of
functional objects. An object that functions may nonetheless have an
aesthetically pleasing form that is not required by and does not
contribute to that function. Design patents protect that ornamental form
rather than the functional object. While design patents, unlike
copyrights, are examined by the PTO, that examination process is much
more pro forma than it is for utility patents. Perhaps in part because of
the difficulty of searching designs, the PTO is extremely unlikely to
2 26
reject a design patent application as too similar to existing designs.
Despite their name, design patents have more in common with copyright
law than with utility patent law. And because they are easier to get than
utility patents, there is a risk that design patents owners will use their
patents to try to prevent competitors from using the functional aspects of

the market for the product and generally serves no trademark-related purpose."). Some
courts have permitted this, however. See Romm Art Creations Ltd. v. Simcha Int'l, 786

F. Supp. 1126, 1130, 1135 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
Justin Hughes argues that aesthetic functionality, properly understood, isn't really about
aesthetics at all, but about preventing trademark owners from capitalizing on preexisting
cognitive or perceptual biases that make them prefer one product to another. Justin Hughes,
Non-Traditional Trademarks and the Dilemma of Aesthetic Functionality, in The Protection
of Non-Traditional Marks: Critical Perspectives (Irene Calboli & Martin Senftleben eds.,
forthcoming 2018). We think Hughes identifies an important reason for the aesthetic
functionality doctrine, but we are not persuaded it is the only one. Unless a preference for
more attractive features is a preexisting cognitive "bias" (and perhaps it is), his approach
would permit protection of works based not on their source-identifying qualities but merely
because people like them better. Protecting the intrinsic value of a design is something best
left to copyright and design patent law.
226

See, e.g., Crouch, supra note 29, at 17-23.
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narrowing protection under this test. In most cases, that test will lead a
court to refuse to find functionality as a reason to narrow or eliminate
the scope of the design patent.23
Design patent law's functionality exception is significantly narrower
than the corresponding functionality doctrines in either copyright or
trade dress law. This is largely because design patent law treats a much
larger swath of creations as non-functional. Trade dress law excludes
product configuration from protection if the shape of the product affects
its cost or quality, and copyright law refuses protection to elements
dictated by function or in which there are only a limited number of
options available. Design patent functionality, by contrast, refuses
protection to a design element only if there is no other alternative to the
element. 2 32 That is a narrow definition of functionality that affects the
nature of the functionality screen. It means that design patents can and
do end up protecting design elements that perform a valuable function,
simply because there are other possible ways of implementing the

function, even if they aren't as good. To count as "functional" for
purposes of a design patent then, it is not sufficient that a component has
utility, as it is for copyright and trademark law. The component must be

231

Sarah Burstein, Faux Amis in Design Law, 105 Trademark Rep. 1455, 1456-57

(2016).
232 See, e.g., Ethicon Endo-Surgery v. Covidien, Inc., 796 F.3d 1312, 1329-30 (Fed. Cir.
2015); Jason J. Du Mont & Mark D. Janis, Functionality in Design Protection Systems, 19 J.
Intell. Prop. L. 261, 281-85 (2012). A rare example in which a court found no alternative is
Best Lock Corp. v. Ilco Unican Corp., 94 F.3d 1563, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding that the
design of a key blade blank was dictated solely by its function of allowing keys to be cut into

it).
Some courts have articulated a multifactor test for design patent functionality:
Assessing various factors may help determine whether a claimed design, as a whole,
is "dictated by" functional considerations:
[1] whether the protected design represents the best design; [2] whether
alternative designs would adversely affect the utility of the specified article; [3]
whether there are any concomitant utility patents; [4] whether the advertising
touts particular features of the design as having specific utility; [5] and whether
there are any elements in the design or an overall appearance clearly not
dictated by function.
High Point Design v. Buyers Direct, 730 F.3d 1301, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (quoting PGH
Techs. v. St. John Cos., 469 F.3d 1361, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). But even that court has
emphasized that the fact that a design is primarily functional is not enough reason to reject a
design patent for functionality.

de

11

LS. Pa~efit N~. D6234I1~

FunctionalityScreens

2017 ]

13 53

Nonetheless, the Federal Circuit held that the district court's claim
construction improperly eliminated the functional aspects from the
claimed design. 23 9 The Federal Circuit said that despite its functional

aspects, the ornamental design must be protected as a whole. As the
court put it, a court cannot "eliminate a structural element from the
claimed ornamental design, even though that element also serve[s] a
functional purpose." 2 4 0 The district court erred, on this view, when it
construed the claim so as to completely eliminate the functional features
from the scope of the claim; rather, it should have looked to the "overall
design of Coleman's personal flotation device." 24 ' Notably, that means
that the court should have allowed protection for features even though
they are functional.
The Federal Circuit's decision in this regard creates a conflict with its
prior opinion in Richardson.2 4 2 Instead of functionality causing the law
to refuse protection to elements that included both functional and
ornamental parts, Sport Dimension does the opposite. It says, in effect,
that if a design has both functional and ornamental parts, design patent
law will protect the functional parts in order to make sure that it also
protects the ornamental parts. 24 3 The approach taken here is the inverse
of how copyright law treated aspects of a design that are both functional
and non-functional before Star Athletica. When a particular feature, for
example, the leg of chair, is both functional and non-functional,
copyright law excluded the design of the leg.244 The rule applied in Sport
Dimension, however, would include the design of the leg within the
scope of patent.2 45
If we depict the Sport Dimension approach using our graphics, it

would look like this.
239 Id. at 1321-23.
24 Id. at

1321.

241

Id. at 1323.

242

597 F.3d at 1288.

243 Sport Dimension, 820 F.3d at 1323.
244 Or at least it did before Star Athletica. The result after that case
is unclear. See supra
Subsection III.A.2.b.
245 In theory, design patent law might moderate the effects of this approach by narrowing
the scope of the design patent at the infringement stage. But there is little evidence it actually
does so in practice.

4
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screening functionality. In this Part, we offer such an analysis, focusing

on the ways that the different screens generate administrative costs and
error costs. Then, we consider whether the particular standards used in
each field are appropriate in light of the costs and benefits they produce.
A. The Costs and Benefits of Screening Functionality
Each of the approaches to screening functionality has benefits and
costs. In particular, the different screening mechanisms generate
different administrative costs, including litigation costs, and different
error costs. 247 We review them here.
1. Administrative and Litigation Costs
Like all legal doctrines, the functionality screens impose certain costs,
although some screens are costlier than others. All legal rules entail
some degree of administrative costs. 248 For IP rights, these include the
expenses associated with examining and registering claims at the
Copyright Office and, especially, at the PTO. 2 4 9 Copyright, trademark,
and design patent laws all impose at least some degree of administrative
review in order to register works, marks, and designs. For example, the
Copyright Office will review registrations for PGS works to determine
whether they satisfy the useful articles doctrinal threshold. 25 0 If a
247

Richard A. Posner,

An Economic

Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial
Administration, 2 J. Legal Stud. 399, 399-400 (1973) ("The purpose of legal procedure is
conceived to be the minimization of the sum of two types of costs: 'error costs' (the social
costs generated when a judicial system fails to carry out the allocative or other social
functions assigned to it), and the 'direct costs' (such as lawyers', judges', and litigants' time)
of operating the legal dispute-resolution machinery."). Posner's "direct costs" are now
generally referred to as "administrative costs."
248 William McGeveran, The Trademark Fair Use Reform Act, 90 B.U. L. Rev. 2267, 2280
(2010) ("Administrative costs are the costs of making a decision. Examples of administrative
costs in expressive use cases might include the cost of empanelling a jury, or the cost of
commissioning a survey to determine whether a mark has secondary meaning." (footnote
omitted) (citing Eugene Kontorovich, The Constitution in Two Dimensions: A Transaction
Cost Analysis of Constitutional Remedies, 91 Va. L. Rev. 1135, 1147 (2005); Howard A.
Shelanski & J. Gregory Sidak, Antitrust Divestiture in Network Industries, 68 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 1, 19 (2001))).
249 Jason Schultz & Jennifer M. Urban, Protecting Open Innovation: The Defensive Patent
License as a New Approach to Patent Threats, Transaction Costs, and Tactical Disarmament,
26 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 1, 9 (2012).
250 U.S. Copyright Office, supra note 179, at ch. 900,
§ 924.2.
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putative author attempts to register the design of an automobile for
copyright protection, the Copyright Office will reject the registration.2 51
Similarly, for trademarks and design patents, the PTO will apply those
regimes' functionality screens as a matter of ex ante review before
registration. 5 2 The review in the PTO is significantly more detailed25 3
and therefore costlier-than in the Copyright Office, however.

In addition, granting rights over works, designs, and marks means that
some claimants will generate litigation expenses both for the legal
system and for the parties. 5 4 In some cases, litigation can entail judicial
review of administrative decisions by the Copyright Office and the
PTO. 5 5 In other cases, it will involve suits for violation of rights or for
declaratory judgment that rights have not been infringed. All litigation

consumes scarce judicial and attorney resources and is, at best, zero sum
for the field as a whole. 256 The magnitude of litigation costs is likely to
vary, however, depending on when and how functionality screens apply.
The earlier a court applies a functionality screen, the less likely it is the
case will settle before it and the parties have to expend the resources to
litigate functionality. On the other hand, to the extent that functionality
screens occur earlier in litigation, as matters of law or in scope
determinations, the costs of trying cases and empaneling juries will be
eliminated when the claims are dismissed as a result of the review.
Assessing the value of administrative and litigation costs associated
with a particular legal rule can be difficult. Often there will be a tradeoff

251 See id. § 924.1.
252 See 15 U.S.C.

§ 1052(e)(5) (2012) (denying registration to any matter that is
functional); Craig Zieminski, Note, A Function for Markman Claim Construction in Design
Patents, 90 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc'y 326, 329-30 (2008) (discussing design patent
applications); see also Barton Beebe, Is the Trademark Office a Rubber Stamp?, 48 Hous. L.
Rev. 751, 758 (2011) (discussing trademark registration process).
2 Little is known about how rigorously the Copyright Office reviews applications as an
empirical matter, but it is widely agreed to be an easier hurdle for applications than the PTO
is. See Schultz & Urban, supra note 249, at 9.
254 See James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Essay, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes,
99 Cornell L. Rev. 387, 422-23 (2014).
255 Thomas G. Field, Jr., Judicial Review of Copyright Examination, 44 IDEA 479, 481
(2004); Jonathan S. Masur & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Deference Mistakes, 82 U. Chi. L.

Rev. 643, 653 (2015).
256 That is, the winning party never wins more in value than the losing party loses when
accounting for each side's litigation costs and the costs of running a judicial tribunal.
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between upfront costs of examining and registering works, marks, and
designs and downstream litigation costs.257 On the one hand, increasing

the degree of ex ante examination provided at an early stage will
increase costs for administrative agencies, 25 ' but, on the other hand, by
refusing to grant certain dubious IP rights in the first instance, courts and
litigants will be spared the costs of trials.25 9 To know which cost is
greater, we need to know not only how much time and money parties
and decisionmakers spend at each stage, but also how likely it is that a
party granted an IP right will enforce that right in court. 260 Thus, the
value of different screening mechanisms will be based on the magnitude
of administrative costs and their effect on the magnitude of litigation
costs. 2 61 Their value will also be based on the strength of the
presumptions afforded to ex ante determinations. When those
determinations are challenged in court, the benefits of initial screening

disappear.
2. Error Costs
In an ideal world, no one makes mistakes. But we don't live in such a
world. 262 Determining whether a given feature of a product is functional

or not is a difficult task, and decisionmakers are bound to make
mistakes. Accurately assessing functionality requires coherent and
articulable standards for understanding which design elements to sort
into which categories. 263 For example, should a design feature be treated
as functional if the designer intended it to be functional, or should it be

257 See David Fagundes & Jonathan S. Masur, Costly Intellectual
Property, 65 Vand. L.
Rev. 677, 681-85 (2012) (discussing the social value of costly screens); Jonathan S. Masur,
Costly Screens and Patent Examination, 2 J. Legal Analysis 687, 710 (2010).

258 See Thomas F. Cotter, The Procompetitive Interest in Intellectual Property Law, 48
Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 483, 489-90 (2006) (noting that the costs of deep inquiry into
competitive effects may not be worth the benefits to competition).
259 See Masur, supra note 257, at 709-11.
261 Id. at 687 (noting that examiners spend eighteen hours on average
on every utility
patent). We suspect that the number is lower for design patents.
261 See Fagundes & Masur, supra note 257, at 691-94.
262 See generally Joseph Scott Miller, Error Costs & IP Law, 2014 U.
Ill. L. Rev. 175

(discussing the types of errors courts make when determining the scope of IP rights and the
costs of those errors).
263 McKenna & Sprigman, supra note 7, at 493-94.
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treated as functional if consumers treat it as functional? 264 Any single,
coherent article or product has to be dissected and its components
analyzed. This might not be difficult in some cases, but in other cases it
is impossible because the two literally cannot be separated. In addition,
claimants will have strategic reasons for arguing that functional
elements are, instead, expressive ones. All of these challenges, and the

limited capacities of the human mind, are bound to produce errors.
When decisionmakers err, they can produce false negatives (failing to
identify functional elements) or false positives (mistakenly treating an
expressive element as functional). 265 In the former, designs get protected
that should not be, and in the latter designs that should be protected are
not. In determining the value of different screening regimes, the law
should consider both the relative costs of each of these kinds of errors
and their relative probabilities.
False positives and false negatives for functionality impose different
sorts of costs on an IP system. 266 When a decisionmaker determines that
a feature or design is functional when it isn't, the creator of that feature
will be denied an IP right when one was appropriate. Because IP rights
generally 267 exist to encourage certain kinds of behavior, the loss of a
right due to a false positive creates an incentive cost. If a court treats the
design of a lamp base as functional when it should have been treated as
non-functional, designers of lamp bases will be insufficiently
incentivized to create them. Conversely, when a decisionmaker
determines that a feature or design is not functional when it actually is,
the creator of the feature will be given an IP right when one was not
warranted or a right that controls more than it should. Because IP rights
limit the abilities of others to reproduce and use works, marks, and
designs, false negatives for functionality create competition costs. The

264 Brandir Int'l v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1146-47 (2d Cir. 1987);
Jeanne C. Fromer & Mark A. Lemley, The Audience in Intellectual Property Infringement,
112 Mich. L. Rev. 1251, 1301-04 (2014) (discussing how the perspective of the
decisionmaker matters in assessing IP rights). The Supreme Court rejected an artist's intent
test in Star Athletica v. Varsity Brands, 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1014-16 (2017).
265 Miller, supra note 262, at 182.

266 Id. at 182-85 (discussing the differences between false positive costs and false negative
costs).
267 As we explained above, trademark law is less about encouraging creative behavior than
it is about protecting consumers from confusion in the marketplace. See supra notes 197-97.
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owners of inappropriately granted rights will be able to limit competition
for functional items without having passed the more stringent tests for
utility patents.
As we explain more below, the different functionality screens vary in
the extent to which they are likely to produce false positives and false
negatives for functionality. When considering the value of different
functionality screens, then, the law must weigh the relative magnitudes
of false positives and false negatives. It is possible that false positives
for functionality are just as costly as false negatives. We strongly doubt
that this is the case. False negatives for functionality are, as we
explained above, enormously costly to society, because they allow
creators to control competition (and thus the price of access to works)
without satisfying the demands of utility patent law. 268 Inappropriately
protecting functional components of designs through copyright,
trademark, or design patents can have considerable influence on the
prices that consumers pay for products and on the opportunities that
downstream creators have for reusing them. By contrast, failing to
protect a design that should have received protection is not likely to be
all that harmful. In copyright and design patent law, the immediate
incentive effects are likely to be negligible, since the works have already
come into existence. The public has already gotten the benefit of the
creations. Subsequent creators may be less motivated to create new
works if they fear under-protection, but this is not obviously the case,
especially if the decision that the design is functional is fact-specific
rather than broad. 269 And, in trademark law, if trade dress is improperly
denied protection due to perceived functionality, the claimant can adopt
another mark that can serve the same purpose. For example, instead of
relying on the design of the product to signal source, the producer can
instead include a word mark that has the same effect. Indeed, it is rare in

268 See Miller, supra note 262, at 182 ("[F]alse positives (erroneous grants of an IP
entitlement) are systematically more costly than false negatives (erroneous denials of an IP
entitlement).").
269 For example, if creators are generally over-optimistic about the value of what they have
created, they may not be concerned about future works not obtaining protection. Christopher
Buccafusco & Christopher Jon Sprigman, The Creativity Effect, 78 U. Chi. L. Rev. 31, 31

(2011); Andres Sawicki, Risky IP, 48 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 81, 83-87 (2016).
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the extreme that a product configuration itself is the only or even the
primary way in which a producer brands its product.270
Finally, in considering the costs and benefits of the different
functionality screens, the law must evaluate the probability that
decisionmakers will make one or the other kind of error.2 7 ' If
decisionmakers' errors are randomly distributed, they may not have a
particularly strong effect on the efficiency of the IP system as a whole. 27 2
But it is possible instead that decisionmakers' errors are systematically
skewed. We suspect, for example, that decisionmakers are risk averse
about denying protection, because the costs of denial are more salient
(someone loses a right) than are the costs of protection (diminished
competition). In addition, litigants' strategic behavior, especially in ex
parte proceedings before the Copyright Office or the PTO, as well as
decisionmakers' financial incentives to grant rights, 273 will produce more
false negatives than false positives for functionality, and the law will
tend to over-protect designs. It may also be the case that judges and
juries assess functionality differently. There is some evidence that juries
are more likely than judges to make holistic judgments about similarity
rather than parsing the work and filtering out unprotected elements.2 7 4
In light of this analysis of administrative and error costs, we now
address the relative merits of the different functionality screens.
B. Analyzing the Costs and Benefits of the Different Screens
Filtering. Filtering is potentially the most accurate system for

dividing non-functional from

functional elements.

If courts can

27 See, e.g., Deven R. Desai, From Trademarks to Brands, 64 Fla. L. Rev. 981, 993
(2012); Philipp G. Sandner, The Identification of Trademark Filing Strategies: Creating,
Hedging, Modernizing, and Extending Brands, 99 Trademark Rep. 1257, 1262 (2009)
(discussing the common practice of multiple branding of products).
271 Posner, supra note 247, at 401.
272 Although some designs will be protected when they should
not have been, others will
not be protected when they should have been. Random errors will wash out. This will still be
costly, however, because it produces greater uncertainty for claimants and for litigants.

2

See Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Does Agency Funding Affect

Decisionmaking?: An Empirical Assessment of the PTO's Granting Patterns, 66 Vand. L.
Rev. 67, 70 (2013) (presenting data suggesting that the PTO's fee schedule biases it towards
granting patents).
274 See Fromer & Lemley, supra note
264, at 1283.
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accurately determine functionality, they can precisely parse the wheat

that is potentially worthy of protection from the chaff that isn't. As a
result, the law doesn't have to worry about under-protection in the ways
that arise with other regimes. At least in an ideal world, there will be no
false positives for functionality-situations in which otherwise
protectable content is excluded. In addition, in an ideal world, there will
be no false negatives for functionality, where functional content
inappropriately receives protection. If decisionmakers apply Filtering
correctly, almost every work, mark, or design will receive some

protection, and their non-functional elements will be protected while
their functional elements will not.
"If decisionmakers can get it right" is an awfully big "if," however.
Parsing non-functional from functional content is difficult. As we noted
above, we suspect that decisionmakers are likely to produce more false
negatives for functionality than false positives. 275 This may occur
because agencies, courts, and juries are more reluctant to deny
protection than to grant it. The costs of denial are likely to appear more
salient than the costs of granting protection. 276 Given the greater
prevalence of false negatives for functionality and claimants' strategic
behavior, Filtering may often result in significant competition costs. 277
Conversely, because almost every work will receive at least some

protection under a Filtering approach, almost no works, marks, or
designs will be removed from the system ex ante. This will reduce the
risks of incentive costs due to under-protection. In theory, we could
mitigate that risk by finding only narrow protection for those works
when it comes to infringement, but as Mark Lemley and Mark McKenna

have argued, courts are unlikely to do so when the invalidity and noninfringement inquiries are separated, as they frequently are. 278
Filtering, because it typically happens during infringement litigation,
tends to be associated with ex post jury review rather than ex ante

administrative or judicial review. 279 Accordingly, because Filtering tends
not to kick creations out of the legal system at the outset, it produces
See Frakes & Wasserman, supra note 273 and accompanying text.
276 Id. at 70.
275
277

27 See supra notes 267-68 and accompanying text.
278 Lemley & McKenna, supra note 63, at 2267-68.

279 Id. at 2268; Fromer & Lemley, supra note 264, at 1269; Risch, supra note 232, at 55.
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fewer upfront administrative costs but much greater downstream
litigation costs. Further, because Filtering is so fact-specific, it is very
hard to do at the outset of a case, even if the case seems like one that
should be easy.2 80 And the result will be correspondingly less certain.
More cases will go to trial under a Filtering approach, increasing costs
for both courts and parties. Those costs in turn might drive cost-sensitive
defendants to cave in rather than fight a case to the finish. Whether these
risks are worth it depends, in part, on how many claimants are deterred
by a regime that applies some Exclusion or Threshold criteria early on,
creating the possibility of incentive costs. 2 81
Thus, Filtering will have the most value in situations where incentive
costs from under-protection are highest and competition costs from
over-protection are lowest. In particular, Filtering will have the greatest
value when there are works with high functionality but that nonetheless
need copyright, trademark, or design patent protection for their nonfunctional components. Finally, Filtering will work best when litigation
costs are low relative to administrative costs, because almost all works
will enter the legal system.
Exclusion. Exclusion regimes, which offer no rights to any works,
marks, or designs, offer the converse benefits and costs to Filtering
regimes. Administrative costs for maintaining an Exclusion regime arise
almost exclusively at the outset, when Congress or the courts must
decide in the first instance what types of works should be excluded from
protection altogether. But once they have, all a decisionmaker needs to
do is determine that a work fits within that category and the case is over.
There will be little need for administrative review and almost no
litigation, since there are no rights to dispute.2 82
All of these cost-savings produce one significant issue, though. The
Exclusion screen denies protection to legitimate non-functional
elements. Because they are rules rather than standards, Exclusion

20
issue
more
281

Cf. Cotter, supra note 258, at 490 ("[T]he social benefits of protecting the IP rights at
[may] not [be] sufficiently large as to warrant investment of substantial resources into
accurately evaluating competitive need.").
See Fagundes & Masur, supra note 257, at 682.

282 Parties may, of course, dispute whether their works were accurately categorized. See,
e.g., Bikram's Yoga Coll. of India v. Evolation Yoga, 803 F.3d 1032, 1043 (9th Cir. 2015)
(holding that plaintiffs attempt to characterize a yoga routine as a choreographic work
failed).
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regimes offer no opportunity for balancing, and will eliminate a good
deal of expressive material precisely because they are not sensitive to
84
the
context.283 For example, prior to the enactment of the AWCPA,
no
absolutely
non-functional components of built architecture received
2
protection against copying in other buildings. ' Exclusion regimes will
generate no competition costs, because all works are automatically
excluded, but potentially considerable incentive costs, because creative
efforts in these fields will receive no formal legal protection.
Accordingly, Exclusion regimes are bound to be most valuable when
administrative and litigation costs are high. More importantly, though,
Exclusion will make the most sense in situations where incentive costs
are low (perhaps because other means of protection are available) and
competition costs are high. 28 6
Thresholds. A Threshold screen shares aspects of both a Filtering
screen and an Exclusion screen. As one might expect, therefore,
Thresholds share some of the benefits and costs of each system. If the
Threshold is applied when a creator first applies for rights or at the
outset of litigation, it can quickly reject dubious claims to protectable
287
expression when the work as a whole is overwhelmingly functional.
That reduces costs for courts and litigants, and it allows courts to screen
out the weakest cases. The added expense of functionality Filtering
during litigation need only occur for a limited class of works, marks, or
designs.
A Threshold regime also attempts to balance risks of over-protection
and under-protection that arise from Filtering and Exclusion regimes,
respectively. Because works, marks, and designs with little nonfunctional content will fall below the threshold and receive no
283 To the extent the design patent system matches any of the functionality screens, the
best way to think of it is as a reverse Exclusion system, requiring protection even for
functional elements in order to ensure protection for expressive elements. The costs and
benefits of such a system mirror those for true Exclusion screens: it is easy to administer, but
carries a substantial risk of over- rather than under-protection in cases where a design has
significant functional elements.
284 Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, §§ 701-

06, 104 Stat. 5089, 5133 (1990) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 101 note (2012)).
285 See Shipley, supra note 187, at 3-4.

286 For an argument that Exclusion should apply to user interfaces in software, see
Samuelson et al., supra note 104, at 2365-66.
287 This will occur when the screen applies during application or registration procedures.
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protection, there is little concern that decisionmaker errors will result in
over-protection and competition costs for highly functional products. At
the same time, a Threshold system carries less risk of under-protecting
non-functional content than an Exclusion system, because as the amount
of expression increases beyond the threshold, it can switch to a Filtering
regime, allowing protection for works with significant non-functional
content.

That Goldilocks-style compromise comes at a cost, however. As we
explained above, establishing and applying the Threshold can be
difficult. 288 A Threshold system combines the difficulty of case-by-case
Filtering with the added burden of deciding what to exclude entirely
from protection. While in many respects Thresholds offer more certainty
than Filtering screens, they also create additional uncertainty as to where
the line between Filtering and Exclusion gets drawn. And an error there
matters a lot, because it can make the difference between protection and
no protection. If decisionmakers err in setting that line, the outcomes are
stark. If decisionmakers err and apply a higher-than-appropriate
threshold, a substantial amount of expression gets no protection (an
incentive cost). On the other hand, if decisionmakers place the threshold
too low, designs will receive some protection that never should have
received any (a competition cost).

Threshold regimes will operate most efficiently in situations where
investing ex ante administrative costs will correctly exclude many works
that are highly functional. If an agency or court can determine quickly

that some works, marks, or designs should get no protection, the costs of
litigating and enforcing those rights is minimized. In addition, Threshold
regimes will likely work best in situations where there are significant
differences in the relationship between incentive costs and competition
costs across different sorts of products. The threshold should be applied
such that the designs falling above the threshold and receiving protection
are the ones where under-protection would be costlier than overprotection. Conversely, then, the designs falling below the Threshold
and being excluded from protection are those where over-protection
would be costlier than under-protection.

288 See supra note 77.
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C. Do the CurrentFunctionalityScreens Make Sense?

An understanding of the costs and benefits of various functionality
screens allows us to think about how the law might select the best
functionality screen in light of different sorts of creativity and markets.
As we have argued, the relative value of the different screens depends
on the tradeoffs of costs and benefits associated with administration and
litigation and with over- and under-protection. 289 Actually measuring

these costs is a daunting empirical enterprise far beyond the scope of any
one paper. Thus, rather than stipulating what the costs and benefits

actually are, we instead approach the different IP regimes by describing
what facts about costs and benefits would have to be in order to justify
the current system. And while we will offer our own views about each
case, we leave it to individual readers to determine whether they believe
that the necessary conditions hold.
1. CopyrightLaw
It shouldn't be surprising that copyright law doesn't use the same
functionality screen for all classes of works. The relative merits of the
different functionality screens depend on the tradeoffs between incentive
and competition costs, and there is little reason to believe that those
tradeoffs are the same for the wide panoply of works that copyright law
covers. 2 90 Paintings, books, computer programs, dance routines, and

works of three-dimensional design are subject to radically different
markets, and the influences of functionality differ across these media. 291

As we illustrated in Section III.A, literary works, including computer
programs, are subject to Filtering. In practice, this means that almost all
literary works will receive some form of copyright protection, unless

289 See supra Section IV.A.
290 See Michael W. Carroll,

One for All: The Problem of Uniformity Cost in Intellectual
Property Law, 55 Am. U. L. Rev. 845, 846-47 (2006) (describing variance in creative
practices and costs of uniform IP law); see also Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy
Levers in Patent Law, 89 Va. L. Rev. 1575, 1577-79 (2003) (comparing innovation costs in
different industries and arguing that "it makes sense to take economic policy and industryspecific variation into account explicitly in applying general patent rules to specific cases").
291 See Dotan Oliar & Christopher Sprigman, There's No Free Laugh (Anymore): The
Emergence of Intellectual Property Norms and the Transformation of Stand-Up Comedy, 94
Va. L. Rev. 1787, 1840 (2008) (noting the differences in creativity markets across the wide

range of media protected by copyright law).
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they fall at the very end of the functionality spectrum where the merger
doctrine takes hold. The Copyright Office readily registers literary
works without substantial inquiry into the existence of meaningful
expression within the work. This is true even for computer software,
even though the vast majority of the code in a work exists for functional
rather than expressive purposes.2 92
According to our analysis, Filtering makes the most sense when ex
post litigation costs are low relative to ex ante administration costs and
when incentive costs are high relative to competition costs. Are these
observations true of copyright protection for literary works? We are
doubtful that the first condition obtains. Litigation costs are likely to be
particularly high in the case of highly functional literary works, because
jurors will often struggle to separate expression from function in works
like codes, taxonomies, and, especially, computer software.2 93 These
challenges, and the general features of Filtering regimes, will tend
toward over-protection of highly functional literary works relative to the
ideal case. Whether some degree of over-protection is justified depends,
of course, on the opposite case-whether diminished incentives from
under-protection are worse. At least in the context of computer software,
there were some people who believed this to be true in the 1970s when
copyright for programs was being debated.2 94 Because the functional
aspects of programs would rarely meet patent law's more stringent
demands, computer software would go entirely unprotected from piracy
unless copyright law stepped in. Whether these concerns about
incentives were justified at the time we leave to others to debate. 295 But
things have changed. Software is patentable, and there doesn't seem
much risk that companies will not be sufficiently motivated to develop
it. Further, protecting software with copyright law has led some courts to
protect not just computer programs against outright piracy but also to
protect basic program design 2 96 and functional code elements against
292

Samuelson et al., supra note 104, at 2317.

293 See id. at 2315-19.
294 For discussion of these issues, see Pamela Samuelson, CONTU Revisited: The
Case
Against Copyright Protection for Computer Programs in Machine-Readable Form, 1984
Duke L.J. 663, 665-66; Nat'l Comm'n on New Tech. Uses of Copyrighted Works, Final

Report 3-8 (1979).
295 See, e.g., Samuelson et al., supra note 104, at 2310-13.

296 Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., 797 F.2d 1222, 1224-25 (3d Cir.
1986).
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socially valuable purposes like interoperability. 297 These mistakes
generate substantial competition costs.
Other literary works-the vast majority-have more expressive
content, of course, and it makes sense to protect them with a Filtering
regime. Copyright law generally deems it appropriate to grant protection
to books about functional topics, for example, knowing that the
copyright will extend only to the way the author wrote about the topic
and not the function itself.298 Precisely because of their high expressive
content, however, both Threshold and Filtering will produce the same
result for those works. As we noted above, though, copyright law does
apply a functionality threshold when it invokes the merger doctrine.2 99
Once the range of expressive choices available to subsequent authors
drops so low that it imposes substantial restraints, copyright protection is
no longer available. In effect, copyright law's use of a merger threshold
is an acknowledgement that at a certain level of functionality,
competition costs are too high.
One way of dealing with copyright's lumping together of highly
expressive and highly functional works in the same category of literary
works would be to strengthen the bite of the merger threshold by moving
it to the left in Figure 7. Because software can receive utility patent
protection, copyright law is less essential to providing creative
incentives, but the competition costs of overprotection remain. Denying
copyright to more works that are almost entirely functional might prove
beneficial. In addition, use of a Filtering system does not mean that the
filtering decision must be done by the jury. A more structured effort to
distinguish protectable from unprotectable content pre-trial may lead
both to more accurate determinations of what is protected and to lower
administrative costs.30 0
How about architecture? Recall that architectural works, following
the AWCPA, are now also subject to functionality Filtering in copyright
297 Oracle Am. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 1358-59 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
298 See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103 (1879) ("The copyright of a work on
mathematical science cannot give to the author an exclusive right to the methods of
operation which he propounds, or to the diagrams which he employs to explain them, so as
to prevent an engineer from using them whenever occasion requires.").
299 See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
300 Lemley & McKenna, supra note 63, at 2282; Zahr K. Said, Reforming Copyright
Interpretation, 28 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 469, 519 (2015).
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law. 301 Exclusion from copyright protection was no longer an option for
architectural works given the United States' desire to join the Berne
Convention, 02 but was Filtering the correct choice? We are doubtful.
First, most of the litigation involving architectural works has involved
buildings toward the high end of the functionality spectrum, including

suburban homes, retirement villas, and the like. 303 Thus, considerable
litigation costs are being generated for works that do not exhibit
substantial copyrightable creativity. And to the extent that this litigation

produces systematic over-protection,

it can generate considerable

competition costs without significant incentive benefits. 304 Second, and
more importantly, architectural works, and especially the most nonfunctional works, are not subject to substantial incentive costs. There is
not much of a market for knock-offs of designs by Frank Gehry and I.M.
Pei. Most of the customers for highly aesthetic architecture want novel
designs and are willing to pay for them. 30 Accordingly, a Filtering
regime for architectural works seems to make little sense. To the extent
that U.S. copyright law must protect buildings, a Threshold approach

that only protected the most non-functional buildings would be
optimal. 30 6

301

Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650,

06, 104 Stat. 5089, 5133 (codified at 17 U.S.C.

§§

701-

§ 101 note (2012)).

302 Shipley, supra note 187, at 4-5.
303 See, e.g., Nelson-Salabes, Inc. v. Morningside Dev., 284 F.3d 505, 508-11
(4th Cir.
2002) (lawsuit for copyright infringement for design of assisted living facility); Shipley,
supra note 185, at 6.
304 See Collins, supra note 188, at 14-16.
305 See Christopher Buccafusco, Stefan Bechtold & Christopher Jon Sprigman, The Nature
of Sequential Innovation, 59 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 52, 54 (forthcoming 2017) (draft on file
with authors).
306 It is important to note that the scale of the competition costs associated with protecting
some works that do not merit copyright protection could be blunted by alterations to the
scope of the protection offered. In general, copyright law protects not just against perfect
copies of a work but also against substantially similar copies of a work. See Nichols v.
Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) ("It is of course essential to any
protection of literary property, whether at common-law or under the statute, that the right
cannot be limited literally to the text, else a plagiarist would escape by immaterial
variations."). This gives rightsholders far broader protection. But, if copyright law wanted to
let many works into the field but to nonetheless protect them very narrowly, it could simply
grant them a more limited scope. For example, works receiving only thin copyright
protection would only be protected against verbatim copying. See, e.g., Satava v. Lowry, 323

2017 ]

FunctionalityScreens

1369

Copyright law's use of Exclusion screens for culinary works,
perfumes, and yoga routines seems consistent with our analysis for when

such a screen is most valuable. In each of these areas, distinguishing
non-functional from functional content is likely to be challenging, either
for administrators or for juries. And in many cases, works will have
numerous design features that simultaneously involve aesthetic and
functional considerations, making analysis even harder. 307 Most
importantly, though, these fields do not appear to be suffering from
substantial incentive costs due to under-protection. 308 The lack of formal
legal protection for culinary creativity, for example, does not seem to
have limited new works and new investment in the field. And the
existence of knock-off perfumes does not seem to have dampened
creative activity there either. Thus, given the high risks to competition if
creators use copyright law to protect functional aspects of these sorts of
works, their complete exclusion from copyright protection is justified. 309
As always, the final functionality screen, Threshold, is trickier to
analyze. Above we indicated that Threshold works best when a large
percentage of works in a class should be excluded from the protection
entirely without having to expend the costs associated with Filtering at
the litigation stage. This was Congress's intention when it drafted the
useful articles doctrine. 3 10 Works that are the product of industrial
design rather than applied art are not appropriate for copyright
protection and should be channeled into the design patent regime. 311 The
threshold that copyright law applied to PGS works prior to Star
Athletica v. Varsity Brands was intended to accomplish this task.

F.3d 805, 812 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that plaintiff's thin copyright on his sculpture does
not extend to cover defendant's similar sculpture).
307 See, e.g., Kim Seng Co. v. J & A Imps., 810 F. Supp. 2d 1046,
1053 (C.D. Cal. 2011)
(explaining that the functionality of the food in plaintiff's dishes was inseparable from their
original expression).
308 Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Knockoff Economy: How Imitation Sparks
Innovation 9-10 (2012); Christopher Buccafusco, Making Sense of Intellectual Property
Law, 97 Cornell L. Rev. 501, 548 (2012); Buccafusco, supra note 177, at 1149-55.
309 We suspect that some might argue that a functionality threshold for works with a very
high ratio of aesthetic to functional content would be appropriate for culinary creativity. This
could certainly be true if such works face significant incentive costs due to under-protection.
310 H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 55 (1976), reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5668.
311 Jason J. Du Mont, A Non-Obvious Design: Reexamining the Origins of the Design

Patent Standard, 45 Gonz. L. Rev. 531, 588 (2009/10).
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The 1976 Act lumps together all PGS works, 12 but obviously the
incentives and markets that apply to fine art paintings differ
considerably from those that apply to garment and flatware design.
Paintings occupy a position on the far left of our spectrum. Accordingly,
they generate little in the way of competition costs, because painters are
rarely able to prevent utilitarian uses through copyrights. Thus, Filtering
seems to work well for these sorts of works. And because all paintings
have some meaningful expression in them, ex ante administrative review
for functionality will be needlessly costly. At the other end of the
spectrum, garment designs are largely functional, and even their few
non-functional features are often inherently tied to functional
considerations like affecting the appearance of the wearer. 1 3 Allowing
garment designers to protect their works with copyrights could,
therefore, have substantial effects on comhpetition for functional features.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court decision in Star Athletica seems to
undermine the use of Threshold screens for PGS works. 314 The original
plaintiff, Varsity Brands, produces uniforms that are largely composed
of functional and dual-nature features. Some of the latter features,
including color blocking, chevrons, and stripes, influence the way that
the uniform wearers appear. 315 The designs are intended to make wearers
look attractive, slimmer, and more athletic. Allowing Varsity Brands to
gain copyright protection for these features would compel other
designers to produce uniforms that were less appealing to purchasersones that made them look less attractive. This would provide Varsity
Brands with the sort of competitive advantage that is only supposed to
come from patent law. 3 16 Nonetheless, the Court quickly passed over the
Threshold inquiry, blithely concluding that a work was entitled to
protection as long as the non-functional elements could be imagined as a

312 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
313 Buccafusco & Fromer, Fashion's Function, supra note 78, at 1-2.
314 137 S. Ct. at 1005.
315 Buccafusco & Fromer, Fashion's Function, supra note 78, at 2; Marchese, supra note
155, at 136-37.
316 Brief for the Petitioner at 12, Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. 1002 (2017) (No. 15-866)
("Respondent Varsity is the world's largest manufacturer and distributor of cheerleading and
dance-team uniforms and accessories, commanding 80% or more of the roughly $300
million cheerleading-apparel market."); Brief Amicus Curiae on Behalf of Intellectual
Property Professors in Support of Petitioner at 26, Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. 1002.
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creative rather than a functional work.3 17 The Court even went so far as
to hint that beyond that minimal threshold it might do no further
filtering, 3 18 though we think a more reasonable reading of the case is that
courts must still find some way to separate functional from nonfunctional elements, presumably under some form of Filtering regime.
We think this is a significant step backward in the clarity-and
correctness-of the law. The use of a Threshold for PGS works
accommodated the differences between media with respect to their need
for the particular incentives copyright law offers. Copyrights last for an
incredibly long time. The value of a painting is often only revealed over
the course of many years or decades, so the long term of protection
makes the most sense here. 31 9 Industrial designs for products, however,
change rapidly and quickly go out of fashion. Within only a few years,
the trends that were popular for clothing, fashion, and product design
will have changed, and their creators will have moved on.320 The long
copyright term is unnecessary for such works.32 1 Accordingly, the
Threshold-like features of the useful articles doctrine helped copyright
law deal with the different sets of costs and benefits that protecting the
various kinds of PGS works produces. It did so by channeling highfunctionality products into the industrial-design regime. But now that
copyright and design patent law apply similar functionality screens, 32 2
channeling will be much more difficult.
The value of a Threshold for PGS works largely emerges from
Congress's decision to lump so many different kinds of media together.
The challenges of applying the useful articles doctrine would have been

3 Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1010 ("The first requirement-separate identification-is
not onerous. The decisionmaker need only be able to look at the useful article and spot some
two- or three-dimensional element that appears to have pictorial, graphic, or sculptural
qualities.").
318 Id.
319 This is not to say that it actually makes sense, just that to the extent that it makes any
sense it does so here.
320 See Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox: Innovation
and
Intellectual Property in Fashion Design, 92 Va. L. Rev. 1687, 1718-34 (2006) (arguing that
the lack of IP protection for fashion tends to both enable trends and speed up their
obsolescence).
321 The same can be said for other high-functionality copyrighted works like computer
software.
m Compare Figure 11 and Figure 16, supra (showing how protection differs).
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largely eliminated had Congress instead chosen to split up different
classes of works according to the most appropriate functionality screen.

Paintings could have been assigned to a Filtering screen, and industrial
design could have been assigned to an Exclusion screen. Such a solution
might have the additional benefit of minimizing the risks of determining
where the threshold should apply. Instead of having to guess whether
Congress intended to protect a given work based on its relationship to
the threshold, courts could simply classify it and know immediately
which screen applied. They may have little choice but to do so now that
Star Athletica has opened the floodgates to protection for virtually any
form of useful article, no matter how functional.
2. TrademarkLaw
As we explained above, trademark law adopts a modified version of
Filtering screening that also bears some similarity to copyright's
approach to useful articles. 323 When features of trade dress serve both
source-identifying and functional purposes they are excluded from
protection. It is not surprising that trademark law broadly excludes
functional works from protection. While both copyright and design
patent law exist in order to protect expressive elements, trademark law
does not.32 4 In trademark law, we are not concerned with producers
generating new and creative marks. We simply want them to be able to
signal product source in a reasonably efficient way that does not

otherwise influence or limit competition.
It is true that the shape or color of a product can sometimes serve to
identify its source, but product configuration is rarely, if ever, the
primary means brands use to convey identity. 325 Even iconic shapes like
the classic Coca-Cola bottle are almost always paired with word and
packaging marks that prominently indicate source. So the cost of false
323 See supra Section III.B.
324 Trademark law protects consumers against confusion in the marketplace. See supra
note 197 and accompanying text.
3 See, e.g., Glynn S. Lunney Jr., The Trade Dress Emperor's New Clothes: Why Trade
Dress Does Not Belong on the Principal Register, 51 Hastings L.J. 1131, 1164 (2000). On
branding as something broader than simply protection of source affiliation, see Desai, supra
note 270, at 983; see also Deven R. Desai, The Chicago School Trap in Trademark: The CoEvolution of Corporate, Antitrust, and Trademark Law, 37 Cardozo L. Rev. 551, 604 (2015)

(discussing the ways brands convey identity).
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positives for functionality seems particularly low in trademark law.
There is relatively little incentive risk associated with under-protecting
aspects of trade dress that are actually source-identifying, because the
producer can often simply shift to other marks that work just as well.
Even if product shape or color are relatively efficient methods of
conveying source information, there are always other options available
to producers.
By contrast, the cost of false negatives for functionality is
significantly higher, because granting trade dress protection to a
functional product design would give one party perpetual control over a
design. This produces substantial competition costs when other parties
do not have good substitutes for the functional feature. There are also
significant administrative costs that come from trademark law's decision
to treat functionality as a question of fact, at least beyond the threshold
determination.32 6 Because incentive costs from mistakes are low,
whereas competition costs from mistakes are high, trademark law is
wise to engage in substantial ex ante screening and to use a rigorous
Filtering screen that prevents trade dress from covering useful features
of products. Trademark law takes a more moderate position when it
comes to aesthetic functionality, however, allowing trade dress
protection for attractive features so long as good alternatives remain
available. This too makes some sense, as the costs of false negatives are
lower-merely depriving the public of something that looks good rather
than something that actually works better.
Given the particularly low incentive costs associated with underprotecting non-functional trade dress, however, we are tempted to go a
step further and advocate outright Exclusion for all trade dress.32 7
Almost all features of trade dress will contain at least some degree of
either utilitarian or aesthetic functionality that will give the rightsholder
competitive advantage. If the costs of switching to word or graphic
marks to convey source instead is virtually zero, if the risk to
326 For discussion, see generally Yvette Joy Liebesman, Rethinking Trademark
Functionality as a Question of Fact, 15 Nev. L.J. 202 (2014) (arguing that functionality
determinations should not be factual determinations made by juries, rather legal conclusions
decided by judges).
327 True, companies often spend money to try to protect aesthetic trade dress under the
Lanham Act. But we suspect they do so primarily for reasons we find suspect-to use trade
dress protection to achieve ends that are better suited to copyright or design patent law.
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competition is significant, and if the PTO and courts are investing
substantial resources in weeding out good from bad, it might make sense
to simply abandon trade dress protection entirely.328 Europe seems to
have moved in that direction recently, severely restricting the
availability of trade dress protection for product configurations. 329 Mark
owners would instead be required to use word or graphic marks to signal
the source of their products, freeing up product design for open
competition.
3. Design PatentLaw
As we have seen, design patent law doesn't currently use any of the
standard mechanisms for screening functionality. 330 Instead, it uses
something like a reverse Threshold approach, in which both the
functional and ornamental aspects of design get protection unless
virtually the whole design is functional.33 1 As a functionality screening
mechanism, this approach does not make much sense. It seems to defeat
the purpose of having a functionality doctrine, because it gives design

patent owners the ability to do exactly what the functionality doctrine is
supposed to prevent: leverage their design patents to control functions.
Given our analysis of the value of different sorts of functionality
screens, we can determine what the market for designs would have to
look like in order to justify such an approach. Design patent law allows
patentees to claim all of the non-functional features of their designs as
well as all or most of the functional aspects of their designs when they

328 These features are very similar to those present for recipes and yoga poses in copyright
law, except that the case for Exclusion is even stronger here because the PTO and courts
invest substantial administrative resources reviewing applications. These resources would be
saved by simply excluding trade dress protection.
329 See, e.g., Case C-30/15 P, Simba Toys v. European Union Intellectual Prop. Office
(May 25, 2016), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=178681&
pagelndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=st&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=315233
[https://
perma.cc/3QSA-89QC] (denying trade dress protection for the Rubik's cube); Case C205/13, Hauck GmbH v. Stokke (May 14, 2014), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/
document.jsftext=&docid=152243 &pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=firs
t&part=1&cid=316842 [https://perma.cc/8W2D-7Z28]; Societe des Produits Nestle SA v.

Cadbury UK Ltd., [2016] EWHC 50 (Ct. Ch. U.K.).
330 See supra notes 232-32.
331

See id.

FunctionalityScreens

2017 ]

1375

also include non-functional elements. 32 This would make sense if policy
makers were convinced that industrial design suffers from enormous
incentive risks if under-protected and virtually zero competition risks if
over-protected. This assumes that designers will not create new product
designs unless given substantial IP incentives to do so and that allowing
those designers to claim rights will not substantially hinder the interests
of other designers and the public. We seriously doubt these assumptions
hold true, and we suspect that all objective thinkers do also.
A better approach for design patents would be a normal Threshold
approach akin to that applied in copyright law to useful articles, the
closest analog to designs. Such an approach would forbid protection
altogether to design elements that are largely functional, such as the
floating pontoons in the Sport Dimension v. Coleman Co. case,3 33 while
allowing protection for designs that incorporate significant ornamental
elements. It would not, however, permit design protection to control the
functional aspects of a product, as the law currently does. In addition,
functionality should be redefined, consistent with every other area of
law, not to mean that there is no available alternative, but to encompass
elements that contribute to the cost or quality of the product.
A Threshold approach rather than Exclusion makes sense for design
patents because their point is to protect the ornamental aspects of
utilitarian articles. We want to encourage design creativity. At the same
time, a pure Filtering approach, while better than what we have today,
risks allowing too much control over function for a system that as a
practical matter does very little ex ante assessment of protectability. We
might set the threshold early, during the patent examination process, by
amending the statute to require the patentee to affirmatively demonstrate
non-functionality, as we do in trade dress law.3 34
D. Improving the Screening Process
The application of different functionality screens is generally (though
not necessarily) related to the choice of decisionmaker. Courts generally
give Filtering to the jury, but apply Exclusion and Thresholds

332 See supra notes 231-34.

3

See supra notes 235-40.

334 See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
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themselves.3 35 This is because determining the scope of rights occurs as
a matter of infringement with Filtering, while it tends to arise as a matter

of validity with Exclusion and Thresholds. 336 Thus, if we think juries are
more expensive, more error-prone, or both, that argues for use of
Thresholds or Exclusion over pure Filtering, because those screens allow
judges to take simpler cases out of the hands of the jury, saving money

and perhaps producing better outcomes.
Alternatively, we might decouple the choice of decisionmaker from
the choice of screen, for instance by allowing judges rather than juries to
do some Filtering pre-trial. One of us has argued for just such an

approach. 337 Doing so could reduce the administrative costs of both
Filtering and Threshold regimes by allowing more screening to occur
pre-trial, reducing the cost of litigation. It would also likely increase the

accuracy of the result, since juries are not likely to be particularly good
at filtering out functional elements, and may not even understand why
they are being asked to do so.331
Other approaches short of a pre-trial scope proceeding can also help
reduce the cost and increase the accuracy of a screening system. For
instance, taking a page from the California trade secrets law, 3 3 9 a party
that seeks to protect a functional work under a Filtering or Threshold
regime might be required to identify with particularity the nonfunctional elements rather than using vague concepts like "total concept
and feel" or a combination of overall elements. 34 0 Doing so could help
make Filtering a real tool for narrowing the protection of works to

expressive elements pre-trial, and it could also help weed out cases in
which there is really not much expressive content at all.

3 Lemley & McKenna, supra note 63, at 2268; Fromer & Lemley, supra note 264, at
1266 n.80.
336 See supra Part II (discussing the nature of different
screens).
Lemley & McKenna, supra note 63, at 2273.
3 Mark A. Lemley, Our Bizarre System for Proving Copyright Infringement, 57 J.
Copyright Soc'y U.S.A.
719, 739 (2010) ("Without the benefit of expert
testimony .. .judges and juries are more likely to find infringement in dubious
circumstances, because they aren't properly educated on the difference between protectable
and unprotectable elements.").
3

339 Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 2019.210.
340 Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d
1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1970).
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CONCLUSION: ONE SCREEN TO SHIELD THEM ALL?

Do these considerations suggest that one form of screen is better than
the others? Not necessarily. IP regimes may differ on several of the

dimensions we have discussed. Some IP laws may address works that
are more functional by nature. Even within an IP regime, some types of

works will have more functional content than others. The costs of
distinguishing expressive from functional content may differ with

different kinds of works. And the legal tools we have to work with may
differ as well. So it makes sense that the law chooses different screens in
different circumstances.
Nonetheless, understanding the various ways in which IP law screens

functionality is valuable. First, understanding the costs and benefits of
different approaches helps justify the otherwise-perplexing treatment of
functionality in many IP cases. Copyright's hybrid use of Filtering,
Thresholds, and Exclusion makes more sense when put in the context of

the different nature of the works involved. So too does trade dress law's
often-confusing differential treatment of utilitarian and aesthetic
functionality. Second, understanding how and why different regimes
screen functionality can identify rules that make little sense and need to
change, like the extremely pro-plaintiff rule in design patent cases. It
also offers a guide for resolving copyright in useful articles after Star
Athletica.34 1 Finally, our systematic analysis of the costs and benefits of
different approaches can help guide the courts toward improving the
application of the screens they do use, for example by concentrating
Filtering efforts in pre-trial rulings by district judges and requiring the
parties to be more explicit about what is and is not being protected.

341

Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. 1002.

